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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and Objectives of the Study 
Norway and the Russian Federation have been negotiating over the 
boundaries of their maritime zones in the Barents Sea ever since the early 
1970s. They have failed to agree about the delimitation of the area, ex-
cept from a relatively small area in the southernmost part of the Barents 
Sea through the Varanger Fjord Agreement of 19571 and the succeeding 
Varanger Fjord Agreement of 2007.2 The latter agreement should not be 
underestimated, as it solves the question of the maritime boundary of the 
territorial sea, and could be read as a compromise that maps out the direc-
tion of the remaining part of the boundary in the southern segment of the 
Barents Sea. Yet, the agreement resolves only the boundary to the junc-
tion of the parties’ opposing views since the beginning of negotiations. 
Norway has argued the application of a median line delimiting the bound-
aries whereas the Russian Federation argues the application of sector line, 
leaving a contentious zone between the opposing views of about 175,000 
square kilometres.3 
Against this background, the aims of this study are threefold. The first 
objective is to examine the law on maritime delimitation, de lege lata, in 
accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 
10 December 1982 (LOS Convention). The LOS Convention was ratified 
by Norway on 24 June 1996, and by Russia and by the Russian Federa-
tion on 12 March 1997, and entered into force in 1994, and is thus direct-
ly applicable as between the parties to the present dispute.4 The second 
objective of this study is to examine the procedural obligations of Nor-
way and the Russian Federation under the LOS Convention towards find-
ing a solution on their maritime boundary dispute. Part XV of the LOS 
Convention identifies the procedures available to state parties for the 
settlement of their disputes concerning the interpretation and application 
of the Convention. These provisions will be examined carefully in order 
to bring out precisely what kinds of obligations Norway and the Russian 
Federation have undertaken, as state parties to the LOS Convention, to 
the dispute in focus here. Through these three separate but yet intertwined 
examinations, the overall aim is to get behind the law of maritime delimi-
tation and its application to the maritime boundary disputes between 
Norway and the Russian Federation in the Barents Sea. 
The third objective is to apply the law, as found, on the maritime delimi-
tation dispute between Norway and the Russian Federation in the Barents 
                                                     
1
 Agreement concerning the Sea Frontier between Norway and the USSR in the 
Varanger Fjord of 15 February 1957, UNTS Vol. 312, No. 4523 
2
 Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Kingdom of Norway on the 
maritime delimitation in the Varanger Fjord Area of 11 July 2007, UNTS No. 
45114. 
3
 Oude Elferink 1994, p. 237. 
4
 The Law of the Sea Convention, done in Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, in 
force 16 November 1994, UNTS Vol. 1833, No. 31363. As of September 2009 it 
had 159 state parties. 
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Sea in order to see what solution it maps out. To determine precisely 
where the maritime boundary between Norway and the Russian Federa-
tion in the Barents Sea lies, legally speaking, is not easy, and perhaps not 
even possible. Nevertheless, this study aims to present some overall con-
siderations, taking into account the recent judgements from international 
arbitral tribunals and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 
1.2 Method 
A few introductory words are in order as to the sources and interpretation 
of international law. As international law is not created by any one global 
legislative body, the sources are to be found elsewhere. Article 38(1) of 
the Statute of the ICJ is generally considered to be the most authoritative 
enumeration of the sources of international law: 
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with interna-
tional law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:  
a) international conventions, whether general or particular, 
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;  
b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law;  
c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;  
d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and 
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the vari-
ous nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules 
of law. 5  
It is generally held by the international legal community that this list of 
sources is not exhaustive, and that more sources of law can be used by 
those applying international law than those listed above, although the 
exact scope is currently debated.6 Without taking sides in this debate, this 
study will limit itself to the four mentioned contained in Article 38 of the 
Statute of the ICJ. 
As regards the interpretation of treaties, this study is based on the method 
prescribed by Articles 31–32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (VCLT).7 This method is widely used by states and interna-
tional tribunals, and is generally accepted in the legal community as a 
codification of international customary law.8  
Also national legislation will be examined in order to see how the states 
concerned have preserved their rights and complied with their obligations 
in accordance with the relevant international law. In interpreting national 
legislation, emphasis will be given to the legal text’s ordinary meaning in 
the light of its object and purpose. 
                                                     
5
 Art. 38 of the Statute of the ICJ, 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1055. 
6
 Murphy 2006, p. 65. 
7
 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331  
8
 In a series of decisions by the ICJ, and in numerous arbitral tribunal awards, it 
has been held that Arts. 31–32 of the VCLT reflect customary law. For further 
reading and references, see Cassese 2005, p. 179. 
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1.3 Outline 
In line with the above-mentioned objectives, this study will be conducted 
in three parts. The first part, chapter 2, examines the law and legal frame-
work of maritime delimitation. First the maritime zones in the LOS Con-
vention that are relevant to this study, their purpose and definition, are 
reviewed (2.1). This short review leads naturally to the next point, which 
is the concept of maritime delimitation (2.2). The aim here is to focus on 
the concept of maritime delimitation, its definition and purpose. Then 
follows a presentation of the history of the law of maritime delimitation, 
focused on how the concept of maritime delimitation came about, what 
questions arise when dealing with the concept, and the two schools of 
thought that emerged in the shaping of the law of maritime delimitation 
and that have remained important to the subsequent development of this 
law. These two schools represent two fundamentally different approaches 
to the law of maritime delimitation. The first school favours flexibility in 
its approach to maritime delimitation, whereas the second favours pre-
dictability. Both schools of thought will be pursued throughout the study, 
as tools for analysing treaty law and jurisprudence in order to evaluate the 
law of maritime delimitation, de lege lata. Moreover, a line will be drawn 
from the international customary law that existed prior to any treaty law 
on the matter, to the emergence of the Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and the Contiguous Zone and the Convention on the Continental Shelf in 
1958, and finally to the emergence of the LOS Convention in 1982 
(2.3.1). Next, in 2.3.2 there follows a study of the relevant provisions on 
maritime delimitation in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone and the Convention on the Continental Shelf. 
We then turn to the existing law in accordance with the LOS Convention 
(2.4), beginning with an examination of the relevant maritime delimita-
tion provisions, namely Articles 15, 74 and 83 of the LOS Convention 
(2.4.1). These are in turn compared to earlier rules of maritime delimita-
tion, as found in the Convention of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone and the Convention on the Continental Shelf, in order to map out 
their differences (2.4.2). We also examine the relationship between the 
respective treaty law and international customary law in this context, 
from two perspectives. The first concerns the relationship between the 
LOS Convention and UNCLOS I Treaties at treaty level in the event of a 
conflict between the two. The second perspective concerns the relation-
ship between customary law and the LOS Convention: how customary 
law has been influenced by the LOS Convention prior to its entry into 
force. Then a study of the emergence and concept of a single maritime 
boundary for all purposes follows in section 2.4.3. 
Section 2.5 offers a summary of the findings thus far, after which (in 2.6) 
we turn to how the jurisprudence of courts and arbitral tribunals has given 
effect to the provisions on maritime delimitation in the LOS Convention 
after its entry into force. In focus here are the Cameroon/Nigeria case 
(2002), the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago case (2006), the Nicaragua/ 
Honduras case (2007), the Guyana/Surinam case (2007) and the 
Romania/Ukraine case (2009). Some final remarks and general conclu-
sions to the current standing of the law on maritime delimitation, de lege 
lata, will be made in 2.7. 
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The second part, chapter 3, studies the provisions for the settlement of 
disputes arising from the interpretation and application of the LOS Con-
vention. These are examined in order to substantiate the procedural obli-
gations of Norway and the Russian Federation, as states parties to the 
LOS Convention, to work toward a solution to the issue of their maritime 
boundaries.  
The third part, chapter 4, turns to the maritime delimitation dispute be-
tween Norway and the Russian Federation in the Barents Sea. The aim 
here is to apply the law as discussed in chapter 2, de lege lata, to the pre-
sent maritime delimitation dispute between Norway and the Russian Fed-
eration in order to see what solution it maps out, if any. 
2 The Law and Relevant Legal Framework on 
Maritime Delimitation 
2.1 Maritime Zones in the LOS Convention 
Maritime zones in the LOS Convention are defined in relation to the 
state’s coastal boundaries.9 Thus, the sole precondition for a state to be 
entitled to maritime zones is to have sovereignty over a coast facing the 
ocean.10 This legal concept, known as ‘the land dominates the sea princi-
ple’, has been developed in the law of the sea over the centuries.11 The 
range of coastal state jurisdiction is defined spatially, as each maritime 
space has been formulated as an extension of a coastal state’s jurisdic-
tion.12 Each zone sets out the rights, responsibilities and obligations of the 
coastal state in terms of giving full or limited jurisdiction. Coastal state 
jurisdiction is strongest in the zones closest to the coasts, which in this 
respect are the inland waters and territorial sea, becoming weaker further 
out. The territorial sea in which coastal states exercise territorial sov-
ereignty shall not exceed 12 nautical miles (nm) measured from baselines 
                                                     
9
 Each maritime space has been formulated as an extension of a coastal state’s 
jurisdiction, and is measured from the state’s baselines in accordance with the 
LOS Convention. See for instance Arts. 1(1), 2, 3, 33, 49(1), 56(1) 76(1) and 86.  
10
 However, every state is to some extent entitled to the resources in the seabed 
and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (the 
Area), as this is defined to be the common heritage of mankind. See Arts. 136 
and 1. The Area is regulated by Part XI of the LOS Convention.   
11
 The Permanent Court of Arbitration held in the 1909 Grisbådarna Maritime 
Frontier Case that ‘the fundamental principles of the law of nations, both ancient 
and modern, according to which maritime territory is an essential appurtenance 
of land territory…’ 4 AJIL (1910) p. 227, and in the Anglo/Norwegian Fisheries 
case, the ICJ held that ‘it is the land which confers upon the coastal State a right 
to the waters off its coasts’ 1951 ICJ Reports, p. 133.  
12
 However, internal waters and archipelagic waters constitute exceptions. The 
former are located on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea, and 
the latter consist of the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in 
accordance with Arts. 47 and. 49. Consequently, these two maritime zones do 
not rely on spatial distance from the baseline. Also, the high seas is defined 
antithetically, as ‘all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive 
economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the 
archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.’ See Art. 86.  
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determined in accordance with the Convention.13 The contiguous zone 
over which limited jurisdiction is exercised by the coastal state is not to 
extend beyond 24 nm from the baselines.14 The EEZ, where the coastal 
state may exercise sovereign rights regarding the exploration and exploit-
ation of natural resources in the waters superjacent to the seabed and of 
the seabed and its subsoil, shall not extend beyond 200 nm from the 
baselines.15 The same is in principle true for the continental shelf of less 
than 200 nm.16 But, if certain criteria embodied in the Convention are 
met, the continental shelf may extend beyond 200 nm.17  
Accordingly, the definition of the spatial extent of the maritime zones of 
the coastal state is at the heart of the international law of the sea. A prob-
lem that often arises in determining the spatial extent of a coastal state’s 
jurisdiction is the situation where the jurisdiction of two or more coastal 
states allegedly overlaps with that of the other, as is the case between 
Norway and the Russian Federation in the Barents Sea. This brings us to 
the next stage in this study: the concept of maritime delimitation. 
2.2 The Concept of Maritime Delimitation 
Maritime delimitation may be defined as the process of establishing lines 
separating the spatial ambit of costal jurisdiction over maritime spaces 
where the legal title overlaps with that of another state.18 The spatial 
ambit of coastal jurisdiction may overlap by opposite coasts, and by 
adjacent coasts. While the meaning of the term ‘opposite’ is evident, the 
term ‘adjacent’ is used to refer to the lateral boundaries of the maritime 
zones between two adjoining states. 
                                                     
13
 See Art. 3. It should be noted, however, that foreign vessels may exercise their 
right to innocent passage in the territorial sea, see. Art. 17.  
14
 See Art. 33. 
15
 See Art. 57. 
16
 According to Art. 76(1), the continental shelf of a coastal state comprises the 
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea 
throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the 
continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nm from the baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental 
margin does not extend up to that distance. Hence, the coastal state has right to a 
continental shelf up to 200 nm notwithstanding the geological and geomorpho-
logical characteristics of the respective sea bed. 
17
 See Art. 76(4). In any case, the outer limits of the continental shelf either shall 
not exceed 350 nm from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial 
sea is measured or shall not exceed 100 nm from the 2,500-metre isobaths, which 
is a line connecting the depth of 2,500 metres. See Art. 76(5). In this respect, the 
coastal state shall submit information on the limits of its continental shelf beyond 
200 nm to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set up under 
Annex II of the Convention, see. Art. 76(8). The Russian Federation submitted 
its information on 20 December 2001 and Norway on 27 November 2006. In 
regard to Norway, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf issued 
its final recommendations in respect of areas in the Arctic Ocean, the Barents 
Sea and the Norwegian Sea on 27 March 2009. It is still processing the informa-
tion submitted by the Russian Federation.  
18
 Tanaka 2006, p. 7. 
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The core of maritime delimitation is its international character. It is an 
operation to be effected by two or more states if their legal titles compete 
and each state seeks to exercise spatial jurisdiction over the same mari-
time area. In the Gulf of Maine case, the ICJ held that: 
No maritime delimitation between States with opposite or adjacent 
coasts may be effected unilaterally by one of those States. Such 
delimitation must be sought and effected by means of an agree-
ment, following negotiations conducted in good faith and with the 
genuine intention of achieving a positive result.19  
Maritime delimitation is an international operation in the sense that it 
cannot be effected unilaterally, but must result from a process between 
two or more states. On the other hand, delimiting maritime zones that are 
not in contact with those of another coastal state may be done unilateral-
ly. That follows from the various provisions in the LOS Convention 
according to which coastal states are entitled to do so except when other 
provisions apply: ‘has the right to’ or ‘shall/may not extend beyond’.20  
Also important in maritime delimitation is the distinction between ‘delim-
itation’ and ‘apportionment’.21 Whereas the former is seen as a declara-
tory process, the latter is seen as a constitutive or man-made process.22 In 
this respect, ‘delimitation’ is a process in which an area is delimited by 
taking into account predefined criteria that with weight influence on the 
course of the boundaries, such as geographical and geomorphological 
features of the coast in question. Hence the declaratory process stresses 
the need for predictability in maritime delimitation. ‘Apportionment’, on 
the other hand, refers to a process in which the area is divided in agreed 
proportions based solely on notions of equity on a case-by-case basis. 
Hence, the constitutive process stresses the need for flexibility in mari-
time delimitation. Illustrative in this regard is the North Sea Continental 
Shelf case of 1969. The applicable law was internationally customary 
law; subject to delimitation was the continental shelf between the Federal 
Republic of Germany and Denmark on the one hand, and between the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands on the other. The 
parties had asked the ICJ to state the principles and law applicable to 
maritime delimitation. The Court held that:  
…its task in the present proceedings relates essentially to delimita-
tion and not the apportionment of the areas concerned, or their 
division into converging sectors. Delimitation is a process which 
involves establishing the boundaries of an area already in place, in 
principle, appertaining to the coastal State and not the determina-
tion de novo of such an area.23  
                                                     
19
 1984 Gulf of Maine case (United States/Canada), 1984 ICJ Reports, para. 
112(1). 
20
 See Arts. 3, 33(2), 57, 76(1). As regards the latter, see above n. 16.  
21
 Tanaka 2006., pp. 11–12. 
22
 Ibid. 
231969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of Germany/ Den-
mark/The Netherlands), 1969 ICJ Reports, para. 18. 
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Thus, the idea of maritime delimitation is to delimit areas considered a 
patrimonial right or naturally belonging to the respective coastal states. 
This was not the same as apportioning areas belonging to no one: 
Delimitation in an equitable manner is one thing, but not the same 
thing as awarding a just and equitable share of a previously un-
delimited area, even though in a number of cases the results may 
be comparable, or even identical.24 
So even though delimitation and apportionment may produce the same 
result in many cases, they are in principle different concepts and must 
therefore be dealt with separately. The Court developed its reasoning 
further in holding that: 
More important is the fact that the doctrine of the just and equit-
able share appears to be wholly at variance with what the Court 
entertains no doubt is the most fundamental of all the rules of law 
relating to the continental shelf, enshrined in Article 2 of the 1958 
Geneva Convention, though quite independent of it,-namely that 
the rights of the coastal state in respect of the area of continental 
shelf that constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory into 
and under the sea exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its 
sovereignty over the land, and as an extension of it in an exercise 
of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the seabed and 
exploiting its natural resources. In short, there is here an inherent 
right.25 
Thus, the Court emphasized the need to take into account what it saw as 
essential in maritime delimitation, namely the inherent right of a coastal 
state to areas that are natural prolongations of its coasts. As the area is 
considered inherent, it should be accounted for as such in the maritime 
delimitation. With this argument, the ICJ disregarded the notion of 
apportionment. However, this was not a matter of either/or. The principle 
of natural prolongation did not solve the problem of maritime delimita-
tion. But it underlined what the Court in essence saw as the area in 
question: the area in which the natural prolongation of one state overlaps 
that of another. In this respect the Court held that in the situation of two 
opposite coasts, ‘a median line divides equally between the two opposite 
countries areas that can be regarded as being the natural prolongation of 
the territory of each of them’;26 further, for adjacent coasts, that ‘a lateral 
equidistance line often leaves to one of the states concerned areas that are 
a natural prolongation of the territory of the other.’27 Hence, there was 
need for the concept of apportionment in situations concerning adjacent 
coasts. In this respect, the Court held in its decision that: 
…delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with 
equitable principles, and taking account of all the relevant circum-
stances, in such a way as to leave as much as possible to each 
Party all those parts of the continental shelf that constitute a natu-
ral prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea, without 
                                                     
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid., para. 19.  
26
 Ibid., para. 58. 
27
 Ibid. 
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encroachment on the natural prolongation of the land territory of 
the other.28 
Thus, the delimitation of the continental shelf in the North Sea Contin-
ental Shelf cases was not effected solely by reference to the concept of 
natural prolongation; it was also necessary to invoke equitable principles 
(or apportionment), although the prolongation concept was more import-
ant. The Court apprehended that reliance solely on the concept of natural 
prolongation could generate a result that might not be considered equit-
able. In that regard, the discussion on delimitation versus apportionment 
to a large extent mirrored the two contrasting schools of thought that had 
appeared in the shaping of the law on maritime delimitation – the one 
stressing the need for maximum flexibility; and the other, the need for 
maximum predictability. That brings us to the next subject: the develop-
ment of the legal framework on maritime delimitation. 
2.3 The History of the Law of Maritime Delimitation  
The LOS Convention is the international agreement that resulted from the 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), 
which lasted from 1973 through 1982. It entered into force on 16 
November 1994 and has today 159 state parties.29 As earlier mentioned, 
Norway ratified it on 10 December 1996 and the Russian Federation on 
12 March 1997. The LOS Convention codified already existing rules and 
further developed the law of the sea. It sets out principles and norms for 
the conduct and relations of states on maritime issues in the world oceans, 
and is considered a milestone in the evolution of the law of the sea.30 In 
defining the rights and obligations of states in various maritime zones 
such as the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic 
zone, the continental shelf and the areas beyond national jurisdiction, it 
manages to balance the various competing interests in the use of the 
ocean and its resources in a comprehensive way. Of these zones, only the 
exclusive economic zone and the area beyond national jurisdiction were 
new legal concepts in the international law of the sea; the others were 
known from earlier treaties and customary law. In addition, the LOS 
Convention introduced new provisions concerning maritime delimitation. 
The introduction of new maritime zones and new provisions for their 
delimitation made the concept of maritime delimitation even more 
important than previously. In order to understand today’s picture of 
maritime delimitation, we need to take a brief look at the history of 
maritime delimitation. 
                                                     
28
 Ibid., para. 101. 
29
 Above n. 4 (as of 28 September 2009) 
30
 Ambassador Tommy T.B. Koh of Singapore, President of the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, described the Convention as the 
‘Constitution for the Oceans’ at the final session of the Conference at Montego 
Bay, Jamaica, on 11 December 1982. Published by the United Nations with the 
text of the Convention and the Final Act of the Conference. UN Pub. Sales No. 
E.83.V.5 (1983). 
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2.3.1 From international customary law to the UNCLOS I Treaties and 
the LOS Convention 
Until the entry into force of the LOS Convention in 1994, the law of the 
sea in general, and the law governing maritime delimitation in particular, 
was regulated by internationally customary law and by four treaties 
established at the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
in 1958 (UNCLOS I). These treaties, often referred to as the UNCLOS I 
treaties, are as follows: the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contig-
uous Zone,31 the Convention on the Continental Shelf,32 the Convention 
on the High Seas,33 and the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of 
Living Resources of the High Seas.34 Here we will be concerned only 
with the first two, which concern maritime delimitation.  
For the time prior to the UNCLOS I treaties it seems difficult to identify 
the law applicable to maritime delimitation. Various methods were devel-
oped and used in the context of state practice, international customary 
law and legal theory in the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries.35 
We should also note that only the territorial sea had been developed as a 
legal concept in international law making maritime delimitation neces-
sary. These methods of maritime delimitation were the median-line sys-
tem,36 the drawing of a line perpendicular to the general direction of the 
coast,37 the prolongation of the land boundary,38 the thalweg39 system and 
the common zone system.40  
                                                     
31
 Entered into force 10 Sept 1964, UNTS Vol. 516, No. 7477. 
32
 Entered into force 10 June 1964, UNTS Vol. 499, No. 7302. 
33
 Entered into force 30 Sept 1962, UNTS Vol. 450, No. 6465. 
34
 Entered into force 20 March 1966, UNTS Vol. 559, No. 8164. 
35
 Tanaka 2006, pp. 19–32. 
36
 The median line or equidistant line is that line every point of which is math-
ematically equidistant from the coastlines of each state. A strict median line 
would take into account all coastal extremities in calculating the line, while a 
normal median line would only take into account coastal base points permitted 
under international law.  
37
 This method consists of drawing a perpendicular line to coast or general direc-
tion of the coast. It is important that the parties agree precisely which part or sec-
tor of the coast to be taken into account. Its length may be assumed to vary in 
relation to the length of delimitation line itself. The farther from the coast of the 
ending point, the longer should be the part or sector of the coastline to be taken 
into account.  
38
 This method draws a line in prolongation of the land boundary. This method is 
prone to produce inequitable results where the land boundary does not cross a 
coast at right angle.  
39
 The thalweg is a line drawn to join the lowest points along the entire length of 
a streambed or valley in its downward slope, defining its deepest channel. It 
serves historically to secure for each state an equal area of safe navigation, and is 
usually applied with rivers. Using the criterion on ocean boundary-making called 
for a variety of interpretations as it distinguishes itself from a traditional river or 
valley.  
40
 Instead of delimiting the maritime zone, this system transforms an overlapping 
area into a zone that is common to both states. 
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The Hague Conference for the Codification of International Law, con-
vened in 1930 at the request of the League of Nations, dealt with concept 
of maritime delimitation. A Committee of Experts was set up, and within 
this group there emerged two contrasting schools of thought regarding the 
concept of maritime delimitation.41 One view was the result-oriented 
equity approach, which rejected the use of any obligatory method. The 
other view favoured the use of an obligatory method, employing the 
median line as a general rule between coastal states opposite and adjacent 
to each other, allowing for necessary modifications in order to achieve an 
equitable result.42 It appears that the difference in these two views on 
maritime delimitation consisted in differing emphases given to the value 
of predictability on the one hand and flexibility on the other. The result 
oriented-equity approach gives the court or tribunal a large margin of 
discretion, allowing it to decide on a case-by-case basis without being 
bound by any specific method. This opens up for subjectivity and unpre-
dictability to a vast degree, and might run the risk of undermining the law 
of maritime delimitation. The corrective/equity approach, on the other 
hand, contains a certain degree of predictability by incorporating a speci-
fic method of delimitation – the equidistance method. With this approach, 
considerations of equity may enter later at the second stage, but only if 
the provisional equidistance line produces an inequitable result. The equi-
distance line is as such given primacy, in that it establishes the foundation 
for the delimitation process. But as both schools of thought open up for 
equitable considerations, the identification of relevant circumstances and 
their legal effects remains the crucial part in the law of maritime delimita-
tion. In the following, special attention will be paid to these two contrast-
ing methods of maritime delimitation, as well as to the identification of 
relevant circumstances.  
The Hague Conference failed to codify any delimitation rule for the 
territorial sea. But efforts to codify law on maritime delimitation contin-
ued, and at the First United Nation Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS I) held in Geneva in 1958, they bore fruit. Not only did it 
succeed in adopting a delimitation rule for the territorial sea, it also suc-
ceeded in adopting delimitation rules for the contiguous zone and the 
continental shelf as these two new legal concepts in the law of the sea 
emerged. The relevant provisions are Articles 12 and 24 of the Conven-
tion on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, and Article 6 of the 
Convention of the Continental Shelf.43 Those provisions will be examined 
in the following. 
                                                     
41
 Tanaka 2006, pp. 34–35. 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 The Russian Federation ratified the Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone on 22 Nov 1960 (entered into force 10 September 1964), above 
n. 31, and the Convention on the Continental Shelf on 22 Nov 1960 (entered into 
force 10 June 1964), above n. 32. Norway is party only to the Convention on the 
Continental Shelf, which it ratified 9 September 1971, above n. 32. 
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2.3.2 Delimitation rules of the Territorial Sea and the Continental 
Shelf – a similar approach 
In light of the similarity in structure of the delimitation rules to be ex-
amined, it would first be appropriate to note the likeness of Article 6 of 
the Convention on the Continental Shelf and Article 12 of the Convention 
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. According to paragraph 1 
of the latter:  
Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each 
other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement be-
tween them to the contrary, to extends its territorial sea beyond the 
median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest 
points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial 
seas of each two States is measured. The provisions of this para-
graph shall not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason of 
historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial 
seas of the two States in a way which is at variance with this pro-
vision.  
Firstly, the provision identifies the self-evident point that states parties 
are free to conclude or not to conclude an agreement on the matter. Unde-
niably, they are in position to do so as long as they do not act contrary to 
jus cogens.44 Still, it serves to underline that states parties are not in 
position to act legally by unilateral delimitation.45 Secondly, failure to 
make an agreement on the matter calls for the use of the equidistance 
method. Thirdly, if special circumstances call for a delimitation line dif-
ferent than that obtained through the equidistance method, the equidistant 
line shall not apply. This triple rule of agreement–equidistance–special 
circumstances can also be found in Article 6 of the Convention on the 
Continental Shelf. Note paragraph 1 of Article 6, on the delimitation of 
opposite coasts:  
Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of 
two or more States whose coasts are opposite each other, the 
boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall 
be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of 
agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special 
                                                     
44
 The principle of jus cogens is a peremptory norm of general international law. 
Any treaty is void if in conflict with that norm of jus cogens. The principle of jus 
cogens is recognised as part of internationally customary law and is also 
embodied in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art.s 53 and 64. See 
Dunoff, Ratner and Wippmann 2006. pp. 58–61. 
45
 This is applicable not only to maritime delimitation between coastal states op-
posite or adjacent to each other – it applies in general. In the Anglo/Norwegian 
Fisheries case, the Court held that ‘the delimitation of sea areas has always an 
international aspect; it cannot be dependent merely upon the will of the coastal 
States as expressed in municipal law. Although it is true that the act of delimita-
tion is necessarily a unilateral act, because only the coastal State is competent to 
undertake it, the validity of the delimitation with regard to other States depends 
upon international law.’ (See above n. 11, p. 132.) This dictum has also been ap-
plied to the fishing zone in the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases (United Kingdom vs 
Iceland; Federal Republic of Germany vs Iceland) 1974 ICJ Reports, paras. 41 
and 49, and to the delimitation of the continental shelf in the 1982 Continental 
Shelf case (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) 1982 ICJ Reports, para. 87.   
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circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every point of 
which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured. 
According to paragraph 2 of Article 6, on the delimitation of the adjacent 
coasts: 
Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of 
two adjacent States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be 
determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agree-
ment, and unless another boundary line is justified by special 
circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by application of 
the principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the base-
lines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is 
measured.  
Apart from using the words of ‘median line’ for opposite coast and the 
‘principle of equidistance’ for adjacent coasts, paragraphs 1 and 2 contain 
exactly the same rules – the triple rule of agreement–equidistance–special 
circumstances. We should also note that no legal consequences flow from 
the use of the terms ‘median line’ and ‘equidistance line’, since the 
method of delimitation is the same for both.46 
Finally, comparing Article 24 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and the Contiguous Zone with the two paragraphs of the latter provision, 
we see it contains exactly the same wording, except that it combines the 
two into one single paragraph and omits any reference to special circum-
stances. Thus, a purely mechanical use of the equidistance method is 
applicable to the delimitation of the contiguous zone.  
There are also some other differences between Article 6 of the Conven-
tion on the Continental Shelf and Article 12 of the Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, but these are not relevant for the 
purpose of this study. What should be stressed is that, despite the differ-
ences, the applicable rule is essentially the same47 – the triple rule of 
agreement–equidistance–special circumstances.48  
In conclusion, we may say that by establishing the triple rule in the two 
Geneva Conventions, a model based on the general rule of agreement–
equidistance–special circumstances was adopted. The general rule won 
over the case-by-case model argued by the other school in the shaping of 
rules on maritime delimitation at UNCLOS I. We should also note that 
the concept of equity, which formed the basis for both schools, succeeded 
by the reference to special circumstances. This reference is quite clearly 
meant to correct inequitable results that might result from the sole use of 
the equidistance method, a point that concerned both schools in the 
shaping of maritime delimitation rules at UNCLOS I. Hence, the more 
                                                     
46
 Romania/Ukraine case, 2009 ICJ Reports, para. 116.  
47
 In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, Judge Sørensen stated that Art 12 of 
the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and Art 6 of the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf were substantially the same. See above n. 
23, p. 252. 
48
 Tanaka 2006, p. 39.  
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predictable method of equidistance won ground in the maritime 
delimitation provisions in the UNLOS I Treaties, at the expense of the 
more flexible result-oriented equity approach.  
We now turn to the maritime delimitation rules laid down in the LOS 
Convention. The LOS Convention makes no reference to either of the 
two methods mentioned above. But as long as the nature of maritime 
delimitation requires both aspects to be taken into account, the same 
debate is also naturally found in the travaux préparatoires to the LOS 
Convention. 
2.4 Existing Law: the LOS Convention 
2.4.1 Articles 15, 74(1) and 83(1) of the LOS Convention 
In terms of maritime delimitation, the LOS Convention differs from the 
UNCLOS I Treaties in three respects. Firstly, the law applicable to the 
continental shelf was separated from the triple-rule method in the Con-
vention on the Continental Shelf. Secondly, the delimitation of the con-
tiguous zone is no longer mentioned in the Convention text, leaving 
unclear the rule applicable to the contiguous zone. Thirdly, Articles 74(1) 
and 83(1) of the LOS Convention provide identical rules for delimiting 
the continental shelf and the EEZ:  
The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone/continental shelf 
between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected 
by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in 
order to achieve an equitable solution.  
Article 15, on the territorial sea, has kept the same wording as in Article 
12 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, and 
is thus essentially the same. The following will therefore concentrate on 
Articles 74(1) and 83(1). 
Articles 74(1) and 83(1) make no reference to a method for delimitation. 
They were therefore for a time considered meaningless as they lack any 
form of guidance – leaving it to the discretion of a court or tribunal to 
decide what method to employ.49 Moreover, the use of the term ‘agree-
ment’ in combination with the terms ‘in order to achieve an equitable 
solution’ can be considered to contradict only general principles of inter-
national law. It is a general principle of international law that states are 
free to conclude any agreement as long it is not in violation of jus 
cogens.50 Thus, assuming that Articles 74 and 83 do not qualify as jus 
cogens, states may conclude valid international agreements for delimiting 
their maritime boundaries even if such agreement are considered inequit-
able. Moreover, by suggesting that delimitation shall be effected solely 
by agreement, the provisions elegantly circumvents the fact that maritime 
delimitation may be adjudicated by court or arbitral tribunals at the re-
solve of the parties, in accordance with Chapter XV of the Convention. 
                                                     
49
 Ibid., p. 47. 
50
 Dunhoff, Ratner, Wippman 2006, pp. 58–61. 
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What remains as the sole guiding principle is that the end result of a 
maritime delimitation must be equitable.51 Accordingly, the LOS Con-
vention neither solved nor provided guidance on the discussion of flexi-
bility versus predictability, and the discussion has therefore continued. In 
order to understanding this admittedly not so successful provision, we 
should touch briefly on the legal history of these provisions at the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which lasted from 
1973 through 1982 (UNCLOS III).  
From the outset of the Conference, as with previous attempts to decide 
upon the matter, there was disagreement between the two opposing 
schools of thought – equidistance vs equitable principles, and no com-
promise materialized. At the Conference, the Soviet Union took an 
intermediate position in the debate, not associating itself with either 
group.52 Norway, however, sided with the group supporting the equidis-
tance method.53 
The result was in one way devastating, as what stressed the importance of 
predictability in maritime delimitation in the Convention of the Contin-
ental Shelf was left totally blank in the LOS Convention. This paved the 
way for the maximum flexibility approach in the LOS Convention as to 
EEZs and the continental shelf. On the other hand, the overall importance 
of managing to strike a deal at UNCLOS III and bringing the LOS 
Convention to life overshadows this fact in every respect. Still, the only 
guiding star from this point on was that maritime delimitation had to be 
equitable in its result.  
That brings us to the next point: how the courts and tribunals have tackled 
this situation since the entry into force of the LOS Convention (2.6). 
They were given rather free hands in terms of having the responsibility to 
substantiate what constitutes an ‘equitable solution’ under Articles 74(1) 
and 83(1). Which approach did they choose? The answer is of importance 
for identifying the law applicable to the maritime delimitation dispute in 
the Barents Sea. Further, what would be the most likely outcome of a 
court or tribunal adjudicating on the matter? However, before analysing 
how courts and tribunals have interpreted the maritime delimitation 
provisions in the LOS Convention, we need to examine the relationship 
between the UNCLOS I Treaties, customary law and the LOS Conven-
tion. Special attention will also be paid to the emergence of the concept 
                                                     
51
 Dissenting Judge Gros, in the Gulf of Maine case, called these provisions ‘an 
empty formula’. (See above n. 19, para. 8.) Moreover, the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration in the Eritrea/Yemen Award stated in relation to Arts. 74(1) and 
83(1) that there had to ‘be room for differences of opinion about the 
interpretation of articles which, in a last minute endeavour at the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea to get agreement on a very 
controversial matter, were consciously designed to decide as little as possible. It 
is clear, however, that both Art.s (74(1) and 83(1) envisage an equitable result’. 
The Eritra/Yemen Award (Second Stage), (2001) 40 ILM 983–1013, para 116. 
This was the first award in which an arbitral tribunal decided upon the nature of 
Articles 74 and 83 of the LOS Convention.   
52
 Oude Elferink 1994, p. 138. 
53
 Nordquist, ed., 1985, p. 78. 
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of a single maritime boundary delimiting the territorial sea, the contin-
ental shelf and the EEZ by one single line. The aim of first studying these 
aspects is to broaden our understanding of the concept of maritime delim-
itation as it developed until the entry into force of the LOS Convention. 
That will help us to understand the subsequent jurisprudence in which the 
LOS Convention has been directly applicable between the parties, 
examined in chapter 2.6. Let us begin with the relationship between the 
UNCLOS I Treaties, customary law and the LOS Convention. 
2.4.2 The LOS Convention, the UNCLOS I Treaties and International 
Customary Law 
We begin by examining the relationship between the LOS Convention 
UNCLOS I Treaties and international customary law from two perspec-
tives. The first perspective concerns the relationship between the LOS 
Convention and UNCLOS I Treaties at treaty level in the event of a 
conflict between the two. The second perspective concerns the relation-
ship between international customary law and the LOS Convention, i.e. 
how international customary law was influenced by the LOS Convention 
prior to its entry into force. In relation to the second perspective, we will 
also focus on the gradual materialization of a law on single maritime 
boundaries for all purposes. 
The relationship between the LOS Convention and the UNCLOS I Treat-
ies is relevant first of all because Norway and the Russian Federation are 
states parties to both the Convention on the Continental Shelf and the 
LOS Convention, and a conflict between the two treaties might possibly 
arise. By contrast, the relationship between the Convention on the Terri-
torial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and the LOS Convention is of differ-
ent nature: the Russian Federation is party to both whereas Norway is 
party only to the latter, so only the LOS Convention is applicable be-
tween the parties in this regard. Also, as explained above, the LOS Con-
vention prescribes essentially the same rule as the Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone as regards the territorial sea, so 
the relationship would be in harmony either way. Moreover, the Varanger 
Fjord Agreement of 2007 settled the boundary of the territorial sea 
between the countries, so this boundary is not subject to disagreement 
either.54 
It is clear that in case of conflict between the Convention on the Contin-
ental Shelf and the LOS Convention, the latter is to prevail, according to 
its Article 311.55 Does the agreement–equidistant–special circumstance 
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 The Varanger Fjord Agreement establishes a single maritime boundary for the 
territorial sea, the EEZ, the continental shelf and the contiguous zone from the 
mouth of the land boundary up to the intersection between the Norwegian 
median-line claim and the Russian Federation sector-principle claim. The Agree-
ment came about due partly to Norway’s extension of its territorial sea from 4 to 
12 nm in 2004; moreover, it updates and supplements the previous Varanger 
Fjord Agreement of 1957. See Proposition No. 3 to the Storting, 2007–2008, pp. 
1–3. 
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 Art. 311(1) states that ‘This Convention shall prevail, as between States Par-
ties, over the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea of 29 April 1958.’ 
16 Pål Jakob Aasen 
 
method provided for in the Convention on the Continental Shelf consti-
tute a conflict with the ‘equitable solution’ provision in the LOS Conven-
tion? The former provides a method for maritime delimitation, whereas 
the latter omits any reference to one. It is clear that only if application of 
the equidistance method would produce an inequitable result would a 
conflict emerge. Yet, in the present conflict, it seems highly unlikely that 
a court or tribunal would first apply the method prescribed in the Conven-
tion of the Continental Shelf and then, in the final stage of the process, 
ask if the result produced was in accordance with the LOS Convention. 
Jurisprudence has taken another approach to this scenario, largely thanks 
to the development of a single maritime boundary for all purposes.56 
Moreover, case law seems to have established much the same procedure 
for maritime delimitation under the LOS Convention as that prescribed 
by the Convention on the Continental Shelf: recourse to the corrective/ 
equity approach. 
Now to the relationship between international customary law and the 
LOS Convention. Even prior to the entry into force of the LOS Conven-
tion, many references were made in case law to the various provisions on 
maritime delimitation in it. It would therefore be appropriate to touch 
briefly on some of these cases before examining to which extent the LOS 
Convention has adopted international customary law in its provisions 
after its entry into force. There seems to have been a gradual transition 
from customary law to treaty law here.  
In the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case of 1985, even though the two countries 
were not party to any of the relevant treaties, the essential objective for 
the Court consisted in:  
Finding an equitable solution with reference to the provisions of 
Article 74, paragraph 1, and Article 83, paragraph 1, of the Con-
vention of 10 December 1982 on the Law of the Sea. This is a rule 
of international law which is recognized by the Parties and which 
compels recognition by the Tribunal.’57  
Guinea advocated recourse to the equidistance method, whereas Guinea-
Bissau advocated the result-oriented equity approach. The Court denied 
any obligation to use the equidistance method, stating that: 
The Tribunal itself considers the equidistance method is just one 
among many and that there is no obligation to use it or give prior-
ity, even though it is recognized as having a certain intrinsic value 
because of its scientific character and the relative ease with which 
it can be applied.58 
Further: 
…the factors and methods referred to result from legal rules, 
although they evolve from physical, mathematical, historical, poli-
tical, economic or other factors. However, they are not restricted in 
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 See chapter 2.4.3. 
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 The Guinea/Guinea Bissau Maritime Boundary Arbitration of 1985, 25 ILM 
251 (1986), para. 88.  
58
 Ibid., p. 294, para. 102.  
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number and none of them is obligatory for the Tribunal, since each 
case of delimitation is a unicum, as has been emphasised by the 
International Court of Justice.59  
Thus the Tribunal favoured the result-oriented case-by-case method for 
achieving an equitable result with reference to the LOS Convention in 
this case.  
In the Greenland/Jan Mayen case of 1993, the Court also referred to Arti-
cles 74(1) and 83(1) of the LOS Convention. Here, however, the Court 
had been asked to draw up a fishery zone, not an EEZ. The parties had 
agreed, though, that the fishery zone was to be determined by the law 
governing that of the EEZ, which at that point was customary law. The 
Court said: 
...statement of an ‘equitable solution’ as the aim of any delimita-
tion process reflects the requirements of customary law as regards 
the delimitation both to the continental shelf and of the exclusive 
economic zones’60  
This way the Court established a link between the customary law applica-
ble to the fishery zone and the customary law applicable to continental 
shelf. Further, the Court found that:  
It thus appears that, both for the continental shelf and for the fish-
ery zone in this case, it is proper to begin the process of delimita-
tion by a median line provisionally drawn.61 
Furthermore, it held that: 
It cannot be surprising if an equidistance-special circumstances 
rule produces much the same result as an equitable principles-
relevant circumstances rule in the case of opposite coasts, whether 
in case of a delimitation of continental shelf, fishery zone, or of an 
all-purpose single boundary.’62 
To summarize, the Court first made an assimilation between the custom-
ary law of the continental shelf with that of the fishery zone/EEZ. Sec-
ondly, in so far as coasts are opposite each other, the law of maritime de-
limitation points towards the triple rule, explained above. Unlike the 
situation in the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case and earlier cases, the Court 
now adopted as customary law the corrective/equity approach in the form 
of a triple rule based on the agreement–equidistance–special circumstan-
ces formula. This marked a shift towards a more predictable approach in 
maritime delimitation. 
The view taken in the Greenland/Jan Mayen case was also to a large 
extent upheld in the Eritrea/Yemen case of 1999. The Court first held that 
‘many of the relevant elements of customary law are incorporated into the 
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provisions of the Convention.’ Thus also in this case the Tribunal estab-
lished a link between the new provisions in the LOS Convention and 
earlier jurisprudence in customary law.63 Further: 
It is a generally accepted view, as is evidenced in both the writings 
of commentators and in jurisprudence, that between coasts that are 
opposite to each other the median or equidistance line normally 
provides an equitable boundary in accordance with the require-
ments of the Convention, and in particular those of its Articles 74 
and 83 which respectively provide for the equitable delimitation of 
the EEZ and of the continental shelf between States with opposite 
or adjacent coasts.64 
The words ‘normally provides’ were clearly meant as a reference to the 
corrective/equity approach. This was illustrated by the fact that the Court 
did not consider the median line as the end product. The Tribunal applied 
a proportionality test to examine the equitableness of the median line 
provisionally drawn at the first stage.65  
In the Qatar/Bahrain case of 2001 the Court referred to the approach tak-
en in the Greenland/Jan Mayen case, i.e. the corrective/equity approach, 
and stated it would follow the same method. Thereby it referred indirectly 
to the provisions of the LOS Convention Articles 74 and 83. Thus, ac-
cording to the Court it would ‘first provisionally draw an equidistance 
line and then consider whether there are circumstances which must lead 
to an adjustment of that line’66 Moreover, in the area in which the Court 
was to draw a single maritime line, ‘the coasts of the two States were 
rather comparable to adjacent coasts’67 By this, and for the first time in 
case law,68 the Court accepted the applicability of the corrective/equity 
approach as customary law in delimitation between states with adjacent 
coasts.  
To summarize these cases, it seems that, to a large extent, customary law 
gradually adapted to the provisions on maritime delimitation in the LOS 
Convention even before the convention had entered into force. The main 
reason was either that the Court was asked to apply the provisions 
directly by the parties to the conflict, or because it considered the 
provisions on maritime delimitation in the LOS Convention to express 
the rule of maritime delimitation law at customary level. Moreover, case 
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law turned towards the more predictable corrective/equity approach in 
which the Court first draws a provisional equidistance line and then con-
siders whether there are special circumstances that require an adjustment 
of that line. That approach was used both for the continental shelf and the 
EEZ, first in the scenario with opposite coasts in the Greenland/Jan 
Mayen case, and then in the scenario with adjacent coasts in the Qatar/ 
Bahrain case.  
Much of this development may be ascribed to the emergence of fishery 
zones and EEZ at customary level at the time the UNCLOS III 
negotiations took place, and the practical need that arose in subsequent 
case law for a single maritime boundary delimiting the continental shelf 
and the EEZ. To this we now turn. 
2.4.3 Delimiting the EEZ and the continental shelf: The emergence of 
a single maritime boundary 
In theory, the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone could follow a 
different line than the continental shelf. For practical reasons, however, 
states seem to have wanted to have their maritime zones delimited by a 
single maritime boundary for all purposes.69 The reason for this lies first 
of all in the shared overlap of natural resources between the two zones. 
Both zones give rights to living and non-living natural resources in the 
seabed and its subsoil, but with the limitation that the rights of continental 
shelf are limited to certain ‘sedentary species’ such as coral, oysters, 
sponges and possibly lobsters and crabs. Therefore, as held in the Libya/ 
Malta case, whereas ‘there can be a continental shelf where there is no 
exclusive economic zone, there cannot be an exclusive economic zone 
without a corresponding continental shelf.’70 Thus, having the same 
boundary delimiting the seabed and subsoil and the water column above 
seems practical in terms of exploiting the area in a proper way and main-
taining effective coastal management. Having clear and manageable 
maritime zones can also be said to be conflict-preventive. On the other 
hand, this desire for a single maritime boundary for all purposes gave rise 
to a serious dilemma in the delimitation of these zones. As the relevant 
circumstances to be taken into account may differ for the seabed and for 
the superjacent water column, the boundary of the continental shelf and 
the EEZ may differ. 
The 1984 Gulf of Maine case between Canada and the United States was 
the first to involve a single maritime boundary adjudicated by an 
international dispute settlement body.71 Both Canada and the United 
States had ratified the Convention on the Continental Shelf. At the same 
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time they had asked the Court to draw up a single maritime boundary 
applicable to both the fishery zone72 and the continental zone.73 The Court 
held that the Convention on the Continental Shelf ‘cannot have such 
mandatory force between States which are Parties to the Convention, as 
regards a maritime boundary concerning a much wider subject-matter 
than the continental shelf alone’. By this the Court considered the Con-
vention on the Continental Shelf as not regulating the matter when the 
issue at hand involves delimiting more than just the continental shelf. As 
there was no treaty law regulating a single maritime boundary at the time 
of the Gulf of Maine case, the Court had to rely on customary law. In this 
respect it referred to a ‘fundamental norm’ applicable to every maritime 
delimitation between states.74 The Court was now faced with the dilemma 
indicated above – how to treat the possibility that a criterion suitable for 
one maritime zone differs from one appropriate to that of another. To 
steer clear of this problem, the Court established a ‘neutral criterion’: 
In reality, a delimitation by a single line, such as that which has to 
be carried out in the present case, i.e., a delimitation which has to 
apply at one and the same time to the continental shelf and to the 
superjacent water column can be carried out only by the applica-
tion of a criterion, or combination of criteria, which does not give 
preferential treatment to one of these two objects to the detriment 
of the other, and at the same time is such as to be equally suitable 
to the division of either of them. In that regard, moreover, it can be 
foreseen that with the gradual adoption by the majority of mari-
time states of an exclusive economic zone and, consequently, an 
increasingly general demand for single delimitation, so as to avoid 
as far as possible the disadvantages inherent in a plurality of separ-
ate delimitations, preference will henceforth inevitably be given to 
criteria that, because of their more neutral character, are best suited 
for use in a multi-purpose delimitation.’75 
As a consequence, geological and geomorphological circumstances rele-
vant for the delimitation of the continental shelf were subordinated or 
even excluded as relevant factors, as such criteria would not relate to the 
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water column in the superjacent waters. In order to be considered a 
‘special circumstance’ in this regard, something would have to be equally 
suitable for the seabed and the superjacent waters. Further to this the 
Court held: 
 It is, towards an application to the present case of criteria more 
especially derived from geography that it feels bound to turn. What 
is here understood by geography is of course mainly the geography 
of coasts, which has primarily a physical aspect, to which may be 
added, in the second place has a political aspect. Within this 
framework it is inevitable that the Chamber's basic choice should 
favour a criterion long held to be as equitable as it is simple, name-
ly that in principle, while having regard to the special circum-
stances of the case, one should aim at an equal division of areas 
where the maritime projections of the coasts of the States between 
which delimitation is to be effected converge and overlap. 
Accordingly, in this case the Court favoured apportionment rather than 
delimitation in the context of a single maritime boundary for all purposes, 
and thus adopted the result-oriented equity approach. Yet, this was to 
change.  
This understanding was upheld in the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case of 
1985, where the Court denied Guinea-Bissau’s contention of recourse to 
the equidistance method, saying that:  
The Tribunal itself considers that the equidistance method is only 
one among many and that there is no obligation to use it or give it 
priority, even though it is recognized as having certain intrinsic 
values because of its scientific character and the relative ease with 
which it can be applied.76  
In the St. Pierre and Miquelon case of 1992, the Court reaffirmed the ap-
proach taken in the Gulf of Maine case, saying that the delimitation 
should be ‘effected in accordance with equitable principles, or equitable 
criteria, taking account of all the relevant circumstances, in order to 
achieve an equitable result. The underlying premise of this fundamental 
norm is the emphasis on equity and the rejection of any obligatory 
method.’77  
The 1993 Greenland/Jan Mayen case between Denmark and Norway dif-
fered from the three cases above in the sense that the Court was not asked 
specifically to draw up a single maritime boundary. Rather, the Court was 
asked to draw the boundary of the continental shelf and the fishery zone, 
and thus had to determine whether to apply the method of drawing a 
single maritime boundary, or to consider them separately. Norway argued 
that the boundaries should coincide but remain conceptually distinct, 
whereas Denmark asked for ‘a single line of delimitation of the fishery 
zone and the continental shelf.’78 The Court affirmed Norway’s conten-
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tion by stating that the Court was ‘not empowered or constrained by any 
such agreement for a single dual-purpose boundary.’79 Accordingly, there 
was no law of coexistence of the boundaries, unless the Court had been 
asked specifically to draw them as such.  
When we turn to the cases subsequent to the entry into force of the LOS 
Convention, that reasoning will be analysed as to whether that approach 
is still applicable by international law de lege lata. Examining this is 
important because the Court ended up drawing a coincident maritime 
boundary for the continental shelf and the fishery zone as in the previous 
cases, but now with a separate reasoning for each zone. The interesting 
thing about this approach is that the Court came to the same conclusion as 
in the previous cases without any reference to the ‘neutral criterion’ 
adopted in the previous cases involving a single maritime boundary. In 
this case the Court made its conclusion with reference to Article 6 of the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf as regards the delimitation of the 
continental shelf, and with reference to customary law of the EEZ for the 
delimitation of the fishery zone. If the parties had requested the Court to 
draw a single boundary, the ‘neutral criterion’ would have applied. And 
as a consequence the weight of access to fishery resources would have 
been minimized as it would not be relevant to the boundary of the contin-
ental shelf.80 Thus, had the Court been asked to draw single maritime 
boundaries, the end result might have been different. 
In the Eritrea/Yemen case of 1999 the issue before the Court was once 
again to settle a single maritime boundary between the continental shelf 
and the EEZ.81 The relevant coasts were situated opposite each other; and, 
as mentioned earlier, the Tribunal considered that a median line would 
constitute an equitable maritime boundary in situations with opposite 
mainland coasts under Articles 74 and 83 of the LOS Convention. In the 
Qatar/Bahrain case two years later, the Court decided that the same 
method was applicable under customary law for delimiting the single 
maritime boundary between states with adjacent coasts. This marked a 
shift in customary law from a situation in which any obligatory method 
was rejected and where maritime delimitation was conducted on a case-
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by-case basis to achieve an equitable result, to a corrective/equity ap-
proach in which the court first draws a provisional median/equidistant 
line, and then inquires whether any special circumstances call for an 
adjustment of that line. 
2.5 Summary  
In this chapter we have focused on the law and relevant legal framework 
on maritime delimitation until the entry into force of the LOS Conven-
tion. We started by looking into the various maritime zones in the LOS 
Convention, what they are, and how ‘the land dominates the sea princi-
ple’ embodied in the LOS Convention links the right to each of them to 
the state’s sovereignty over a coast facing the ocean. Further, that the 
territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the EEZ and the continental shelf are 
defined spatially, as they are formulated as a limited extension of the 
coastal state’s jurisdiction over the land territory.  
Then we examined the concept of maritime delimitation. It may be de-
fined as the process of establishing lines that separate the spatial ambit of 
coastal jurisdiction over maritime spaces where the legal title overlaps 
with that of another state. This may occur in situations where states are 
situated adjacent or opposite to each other. Moreover, maritime delimita-
tion where legal titles overlap is an ‘international’ operation in that it can-
not be effected unilaterally, but must result from a process between two 
or more states. As regards the dispute in the Barents Sea, this means that 
Norway and the Russian Federation may resolve their maritime boundar-
ies only through agreement or by consenting to international adjudication. 
Thirdly, the distinction between ‘delimitation’ and ‘apportionment’ in 
maritime delimitation was examined. With ‘delimitation’ is meant a pro-
cess which involves establishing the boundaries of an area already apper-
taining to the coastal state as an inherent or patrimonial right. This pro-
cess takes into account predefined criteria that influence the course of 
boundaries, e.g. the geographical shape of the coast. It is an attempt 
towards an objective and scientific approach to maritime delimitation, 
and thus stresses the need for predictability. ‘Apportionment’, on the 
other hand, is seen as a de novo determination of an area on the basis of 
just and equitable shares. This approach leaves much of the result of a 
maritime delimitation to the discretion of courts and tribunals, and conse-
quently stresses the need for flexibility, at the expense of predictability. 
We have seen that international tribunals have largely avoided accepting 
the idea of proceeding to apportionment. Nevertheless, complete rejection 
of the idea of apportionment in maritime delimitation has proved unat-
tainable. There is thus need for a certain degree of flexibility, as a too 
rigid rule might give rise to inequitable results. Also, the very idea that 
the maritime delimitation is to result in an ‘equitable solution’, as well as 
the recourse to the proportionality test in the third and final stage of the 
maritime delimitation process, inevitably leads to idea of apportionment. 
It is also clear that courts and tribunals have largely embraced the idea of 
‘delimitation’ in their approach to maritime delimitation. We saw this for 
the first time in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases where the ex-
pressed aim of the maritime delimitation process was ‘to leave as much 
as possible to each Party all those parts of the continental shelf that con-
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stitute a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea, 
without encroachment on the natural prolongation of the land territory of 
the other.’ Later, with the emergence of the fishery zone and the EEZ, a 
new approach was introduced, based on distance from the coast. But that 
did not mean that the law of maritime delimitation became removed from 
the principle of natural prolongation. In fact, as later held in the 
Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, the concept of distance as the 
basis for entitlement to maritime zones became increasingly intertwined 
with that of natural prolongation.  
Fourthly, in this chapter we have examined the gradual development from 
international customary law to the UNCLOS I Treaties and finally to the 
LOS Convention. We saw that prior to the entry into force of the 
UNCLOS I Treaties it seems difficult to identify the law applicable to 
maritime delimitation. Then, with the emergence of the UNCLOS I 
Treaties came provisions for delimiting the territorial sea and the contin-
ental shelf. In the shaping of that law, two different schools of thought 
emerged. One view was the result-oriented equity approach, which reject-
ed the use of any obligatory method in maritime delimitation processes. 
The sole criterion should be that the result had to be equitable. The other 
view favoured the use of an obligatory method, employing the median 
line as a general rule between coastal states opposite and adjacent to each 
other, and allowing for necessary modifications in order to achieve an 
equitable result. As the difference between these two schools of thought 
is generally linked to the question of whether maritime delimitation dis-
putes should be resolved by recourse to an obligatory method or not, it 
may also be linked to the concepts of ‘delimitation’ and ‘apportionment’. 
The core of the distinction between ‘delimitation’ and ‘apportionment’ 
concerns the value of predictability on the one hand, and flexibility on the 
other – which in essence is also the core of the debate between employing 
an obligatory method or not in the maritime delimitation process. Both 
debates have concerned the very essence of the law on maritime delimita-
tion: to what extent it should be possible to predict the outcome of a 
maritime boundary dispute also in the future. 
As we have seen, the school favouring the use of an obligatory method 
won through in the shaping of the UNCLOS I Treaties. Article 6 of the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf and Article 12 of the Convention on 
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone prescribe the use of the 
corrective/equity approach by means of the triple-rule of agreement–
equidistance–special circumstances. In the shaping of the LOS Conven-
tion, however, the school of thought favouring maximum flexibility won 
ground, as Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of the LOS Convention omit any 
references as to what method to use. These articles were therefore for a 
while deemed meaningless, as they lacked any form of guidance – leav-
ing it to the discretion of a court or tribunal to decide upon the method to 
be employed. 
We saw how, to a large extent, international customary law gradually 
adapted to the provisions on maritime delimitation in the LOS Conven-
tion prior to its entry into force. The main reason was that the courts and 
tribunals were asked to apply the provisions directly by the parties to the 
conflict, or because they saw the provisions on maritime delimitation in 
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the LOS Convention as expressing the rule of maritime delimitation law 
at customary level. The same period also saw the development of a new 
phenomenon in maritime delimitation law: the adoption of a single mari-
time boundary delimiting both the EEZ and the continental shelf by one 
single line. This rapid development was related to the major achieve-
ments at UNCLOS III, and especially the development of EEZs as a new 
optional legal entitlement for coastal states. In the mid-1970s, when the 
conference was held, many states had started to claim their EEZs, and 
this again pushed forward a new approach to the law of maritime delim-
itation. States began delimiting their continental shelves and EEZs by one 
single line, a practice which in turn became that of courts and tribunals, 
as the parties to disputes asked them to render their judgements that way. 
First the courts and tribunals at customary level favoured the case-by-
case model – the result-oriented equity approach. The Gulf of Maine 
case, the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau case and the St. Pierre and Miquelon 
case are, as we have seen, examples of this approach. Then came a shift 
to the gradual adoption of the model based on the equidistance method – 
the corrective/equity approach. That approach was used both for the 
continental shelf and the EEZ separately in the scenario with opposite 
coasts in the Greenland/Jan Mayen case, and then in the scenario involv-
ing a single maritime boundary: first with opposite coasts in the Eritrea/ 
Yemen case and then with adjacent coasts in the Qatar/Bahrain case. In 
all these cases, the treaty law of the time was inadequate for dealing with 
the legal questions put before the courts and tribunals. They therefore 
started to fill in the existing legal gaps on their own. This resulted first in 
creating a law on single maritime boundaries. The Gulf of Maine case 
was the first judgement in this regard. The Court considered that the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf could not regulate a much wider 
matter than the continental shelf alone. The St. Pierre Miquelon case was 
a further example. Then courts and tribunals were increasingly asked to 
take into account the maritime delimitation provisions in the LOS Con-
vention, even though it had not yet entered into force. The Guinea/ 
Guinea-Bissau case, the Greenland/Jan Mayen case, the Eritrea/Yemen 
case and the Qatar/Bahrain case are all examples of this. The result was 
that international customary law to a large degree adapted to the maritime 
delimitation provisions in the LOS Convention even prior to its entry into 
force.  
In the remaining part of this chapter the focus turns to the jurisprudence 
of courts and tribunals subsequent to the entry into force of the LOS 
Convention. In the cases examined here, the LOS Convention has been 
directly applicable as between the parties, and not, as in the cases we 
have studied so far, where the Convention has been interpreted only 
indirectly at customary level. Have courts and tribunals, in interpreting 
Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of the LOS Convention, followed the growing 
trend towards the more predictable corrective/equity approach in mari-
time delimitation, as seen above? Or have they shifted direction once 
again, to the more flexible result-oriented case-by-case method, as in the 
past? 
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2.6 Articles 74 and 83 by ICJ and International Arbitral 
Tribunals (after the entry into force of the LOS 
Convention) 
2.6.1 The Cameroon vs Nigeria Case (2002) 
On 29 March 1994, the Republic of Cameroon instituted proceedings be-
fore the ICJ against the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The case, which also 
involved the question of sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula, con-
cerned the delimitation of the maritime boundary between the two states. 
The jurisdiction of the Court relied on the declarations made by the two 
states accepting the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36(2) of the 
Statute of the Court. Moreover, The Cameroon/Nigeria case was the first 
case for an international tribunal where the LOS Convention was appli-
cable between the parties in a dispute on maritime delimitation, and is 
therefore of particular interest.  
Method for maritime delimitation 
The parties had agreed through their written pleadings that the maritime 
boundaries should be effected by a single line.82 The maritime boundary 
up to and involving a point G, which concerned the territorial sea, was 
regarded as having been established by former agreements by the parties. 
Now the Court was to establish a single maritime boundary for the EEZ 
and the continental shelf from point G and onwards, until the point where 
the decision might affect the rights of Equatorial Guinea, which was not 
party to the proceedings. However, the presence of Equatorial Guinea’s 
Bioko Island south of Nigeria and south and west of Cameroon made the 
area in question strictly limited. Under these circumstances the Court 
could only indicate the general direction, from a point X and onwards. 
The Court started by reiterating the criteria of Articles 74 and 83, that 
such delimitation must be effected in such a way as to ‘achieve an equit-
able solution’.83 The Court went on to repeat the ‘neutral criterion’ in the 
Gulf of Maine case, stating that the determination of such a single mari-
time boundary: 
…can only be carried out by the application of a criterion, or com-
bination of criteria, which does not give preferential treatment to 
one of [the zones] to the detriment of the other, and at the same 
time is such as to be equally suitable to the division of either of 
them.84 
And further, referring to the same case, that ‘preference w[ould] hence-
forth…be given to a criteria that, because of their more neutral character 
are best suited for use in a multi-purpose delimitation’.85 
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It also stressed the link between the EEZ and the continental shelf in 
modern law as expressed in the Libya/Malta case.86 In this regard, the 
Court noted that it on various occasions had determined what criteria, 
principles and rules for delimitation were applicable to single maritime 
boundaries. Those were expressed in the equitable principles/special cir-
cumstances method. That method, it held: 
…which is very similar to the equidistance/special circumstances 
method applicable in delimitation of the territorial sea, involves 
first drawing an equidistance line, then considering whether there 
are factors calling for an adjustment or shifting of that line in order 
to achieve an equitable result.87 
The Court concluded, by referring to the Greenland/Jan Mayen and 
Qatar/Bahrain cases where this method had been used, that it would also 
apply it in the present case.88 Thus, unlike in the cases of the Gulf of 
Maine, Guinea/Guinea Bissau or St. Pierre and Miquelon, the Court ap-
plied the corrective/equity approach as it had done in the cases of Eritrea/ 
Yemen, Qatar/Bahrain and Greenland/Jan Mayen in this, its first case 
where the LOS Convention was directly applicable. However, it should 
be noted that in the Greenland/Jan Mayen case, the Court had not been 
requested to draw a single maritime boundary as in the Qatar/Bahrain 
case, even though it ended up by concluding a coincident boundary. So 
even though the Court referred to this case in connection with the rele-
vant method to be used, it should be held materially distinct.89 The 
essential point was to underline what method the Court found appropriate 
for the delimitation of the single line. Equally important is the fact that 
the equidistance method was considered applicable in a maritime delim-
itation with adjacent coasts.90 Here we should recall that the Qatar 
/Bahrain case one year earlier was the first case in which the Court had 
deemed the corrective/equity approach applicable in a maritime delimita-
tion with adjacent coasts. That case had been founded on customary law; 
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now, only one year later, the same reasoning was considered as constitu-
tional law in accordance with the LOS Convention. It should also be 
noted that both cases involved a single maritime boundary by way of 
agreement between the parties.  
The Court went on to define the relevant coastlines of the parties by refer-
ence to the relevant base points to be used in the construction of the 
equidistance line.91 It started by citing the Qatar/Bahrain case, where it 
was held that ‘the equidistance line is the line every point of which is 
equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured.’92 In 
this regard, the Court first noted that the maritime boundary could be 
determined only by reference to points on the coastlines of the two states 
respectively and not of third states. Secondly, that it considered the most 
southerly points on the low-water line to either side of the bay formed by 
the estuaries of the Akwayafe and Cross Rivers. In the Court’s view, no 
other base points were necessary for it to undertake maritime delimitation 
in this area.93  
Consideration of relevant circumstances 
After having drawn a provisional equidistance line, the Court went on to 
consider whether there were any relevant circumstances that could make 
it necessary to adjust the line in order to achieve an equitable solution. 
First, however, the Court cited the Libya/Malta case, where it was held 
that: 
The equidistance method is not the only method applicable to the 
present dispute, and it does not even have the benefit of a pre-
sumption in its favour. Thus, under existing law, it must be dem-
onstrated that the equidistance method leads to equitable result in 
the case in question.94 
This could be read to indicate that the Court demoted the primacy effect 
(if any at all) of the equidistance line as the end result by application of 
the equidistance method. According to this view, only if the application 
of the equidistance method leads to an equitable result it is worthwhile 
using, and this must be demonstrated for each case. The Court further un-
derlined this view by stating that ‘equity is not a method of delimitation, 
but solely an aim that should be borne in mind in effecting the delimit-
ation.’95 Thus the Court spoke in favour of the case-by-case result-
oriented equity approach that it had adopted in some of the previous 
cases. What was new in this case is that the Court did so after first having 
declared equidistance as the applicable method for the dispute at hand.  
What the Court really meant to say is not clear. On the one hand it 
favoured the use of the equidistance method, and yet it also held that it 
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was not obliged to do so. What is problematic is not the view in itself, but 
maintaining that view without explaining why it favoured the equidis-
tance method over other methods in the case. A reasonable interpretation 
seems that the Court did not want to be bound by the equidistance method 
in future cases; further, that even though this point did not matter for the 
present dispute, it could matter for disputes in the future. In this regard, 
the Court must be understood as once again stressing the need for flexi-
bility in maritime delimitation law. In examining the cases to follow we 
will see whether this view has been maintained.  
Having said this, the Court went on to identify the relevant circumstances 
and their effect on the present delimitation. Those circumstances were the 
concavity of the Gulf of Guinea, the presence of Bioko Island, propor-
tionality, and the oil concessions of the parties. 
The concavity of the coasts  
The Court began by stating that the ‘geographical configuration of the 
maritime areas that the Court is called upon to delimit is a given.’96 There 
could be no complete refashioning of nature. Although ‘certain geograph-
ical peculiarities of maritime areas to be delimited may be taken into ac-
count, this is solely as relevant circumstances, for the purpose, if neces-
sary, of adjusting or shifting the provisional delimitation line.’ But not all 
such geographical circumstances could be taken into account. In citing 
the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the Court held: 
 [i]t is therefore not a question of totally refashioning geography 
whatever the facts of the situation but, given a geographical situa-
tion of quasi-equality as between a number of states, of abating the 
effects of the incidental special feature from which an unjustifiable 
difference of treatment could result.97 
For its part, Cameroon argued as a special circumstance that the concav-
ity of the Gulf of Guinea in general, and its coastline in particular, created 
a virtual enclavement of Cameroon, and that this would have to be ad-
justed for. Nigeria, on the other hand, argued that it was not for the Court 
to compensate Cameroon for any disadvantages it might have suffered as 
a direct consequence of this area. The Court acknowledged Nigeria’s con-
tention, and held that although concavity might be a circumstance to be 
accounted for, that was not so in the present case, as the concavity did not 
lie within the area to be delimited. The area to be delimited was consid-
ered as the coastlines relevant to delimitation and did not include all of 
the coastlines of the two states within the Gulf of Guinea, as Cameroon 
had argued. The Court held in this regard that ‘the sectors of coastlines 
relevant to the present delimitation exhibit no particular concavity.’98 In 
other words, because the relevant coastlines for delimitation were defined 
by only two base points on either side of the bay formed by the estuaries 
of the Akwayafe and Cross Rivers, there was no concavity involved. The 
determination of the relevant coastlines became crucial for deciding 
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which geographical circumstances should be taken into account; and here 
the Court held that the configuration of the respective coastlines could not 
justify any adjustment of the provisional line. 
The presence of Bioko Island 
Cameroon argued that since the presence of Bioko Island reduced the sea-
ward projection of Cameroon’s coastlines, that justified a shift of the pro-
visional line in Cameroon’s favour.99 The Court noted that islands have at 
times been taken into account as a relevant circumstance when they lie 
within the area to be delimited, but only if they belong to any of the par-
ties to the dispute.100 This was not the case here, as Bioko Island is under 
the sovereignty of Equatorial Guinea. The presence of Bioko Island was 
solely a matter between Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea, irrelevant to 
the delimitation of the present dispute. 101  
Proportionality 
As regards proportionality, the Court acknowledged that it on earlier oc-
casions had considered ‘substantial difference’ in the lengths of the par-
ties’ respective coastlines to be a factor to be taken into account in order 
to adjust the provisional delimitation line.102 These occasions were the 
Gulf of Maine case of 1984 and the Greenland/Jan Mayen case of 1993. 
In the present case, however, the relevant coastline for the maritime 
delimitation of Cameroon was not longer than that of Nigeria. Thus the 
Court saw no reason to adjust the equidistance line that it had provision-
ally drawn.103  
Oil concessions  
Nigeria argued that state practice with regard to oil concessions was a 
decisive factor to be taken into account in establishing maritime bound-
aries.104 Cameroon, on the other hand, argued that oil concessions had 
never been accorded particular significance in maritime delimitation.105 
The Court in response said that both the ICJ and arbitral tribunals have 
dealt with the role of oil practice in maritime delimitations on several 
occasions.106 It went through those cases and summarized as follows: 
Overall, it follows from the jurisprudence that, although the exist-
ence of an express or tacit agreement between the parties on the 
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sitting of their respective oil concessions may indicate a consensus 
on the maritime areas to which they are entitled, oil concessions 
and oil wells are not in themselves to be considered as relevant 
circumstances justifying the adjustment or shifting of the provi-
sional delimitation line. Only if they are based on express or tacit 
agreement between the parties may they be taken into account.107  
In the present case the Court found no evidence of express or tacit agree-
ment between the parties. Hence it rejected the contention that any of the 
oil concessions were relevant for adjusting the provisional equidistance 
line.108 
Conclusion 
The Cameroon/Nigeria case was the first case before an international 
tribunal where the LOS Convention was directly applicable as between 
the parties in a dispute on maritime delimitation. The Court was asked to 
draw a single maritime boundary, and here it recalled and applied the 
‘neutral criterion’ that it had developed in previous cases. As to method, 
it chose the corrective/equity approach – as in the cases of Eritrea/ 
Yemen, Qatar/Bahrain and Greenland/Jan Mayen – in which the Court 
first draws an equidistant line and then considers whether there are any 
special circumstances that call for an adjustment of that line. The appli-
cation of the equidistance method on adjacent coasts must be seen as 
significant, as this had been debated in earlier jurisprudence. We should, 
however, also note that the Court left the door open for using methods 
other than the corrective-equidistance approach in the delimitation of 
maritime boundaries. In fact, it held that there was no presumption for 
any one method to be used under Articles 74(1) and 83(1) – putting, in 
theory, all thinkable methods of maritime delimitation on an equal foot-
ing. However, no explanation was given as to why or when a particular 
method should be preferred over another, making it hard understand the 
Court’s intention as anything else than paving the way for greater flexi-
bility in future cases. As to possible relevant circumstances, the Court 
took careful consideration of the concavity of the coasts, the presence of 
Bioko Island, proportionality of the respective coastlines and finally the 
oil concessions made in the area to be delimited. None of these was con-
sidered substantial enough for adjusting the provisionally drawn equidis-
tance line. The Court found the equidistance line to constitute an equit-
able solution under Articles 74 and 83 of the LOS Convention. 
2.6.2 The Barbados vs Trinidad and Tobago Award (2006) 
On 16 February 2004, Barbados initiated arbitration proceedings concern-
ing its maritime boundary with the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago 
pursuant to Article 286 of the LOS Convention.109 As both states had 
been parties to the LOS Convention at all relevant times, they were bound 
by the dispute resolution procedures provided for in Part XV of the Con-
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vention.110 Neither of the parties had declared, pursuant to Article 298 of 
the Convention, any exceptions to the applicability of the dispute resolu-
tion procedures of Part XV, nor had either party declared their means for 
settlement of disputes under Article 287(1) of the Convention. Thus, 
under Article 287(3), both parties were deemed to have accepted arbitra-
tion in accordance with Annex VII of the LOS Convention.111 The parties 
had carried out discussions and formal negotiations on the use of resour-
ces and questions of delimitation since the late 1970s and in July 2000, 
respectively. But despite their efforts, in the Tribunal’s view, the parties 
had negotiated for a reasonable period of time without being able to reach 
agreement. Accordingly, Articles 74(2) and 83(2) required the parties to 
resort to the procedures provided for in Part XV of the LOS Conven-
tion.112  
The Tribunal also had to examine four other issues: Whether or not there 
in legal terms existed a dispute; the obligation to exchange views in ac-
cordance with Article 283; whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction over the 
extended continental shelf; and whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to 
render a substantive decision as to an appropriate fisheries regime to ap-
ply in waters that might be determined to form part of Trinidad and 
Tobago’s EEZ. In relation to the first issue, it held that there did exist a 
dispute because of the parties’ divergent legal views as to which rules 
were applicable for the delimitation and consequently to where the 
boundaries should lie. Further that the existence of a dispute could not be 
precluded by the fact that negotiations could, in theory, continue. Where 
there is an obligation to negotiate, it is also well established under general 
international law that that obligation does not require the parties to con-
tinue with negotiations ‘which in advance show every sign of being un-
productive’.113 As regards the other issues, the Tribunal held that:  
(i) it ha[d] jurisdiction to delimit, by the drawing of a single mari-
time boundary, the continental shelf and EEZ appertaining to each 
of the Parties in the waters where their claims to these maritime 
zones overlap[ped]; 
(ii) its jurisdiction in that respect includ[ed] the delimitation of the 
maritime boundary in relation to that part of the continental shelf 
extending beyond 200 nautical miles; and 
(iii) while it ha[d] jurisdiction to consider the possible impact upon 
a prospective delimitation line of Barbadian fishing activity in 
waters affected by the delimitation, it ha[d] no jurisdiction to rend-
er a substantive decision as to an appropriate fisheries regime to 
apply in waters which may be determined to form part of Trinidad 
and Tobago’s EEZ.114  
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The Court further emphasized that its jurisdiction was limited to the dis-
pute concerning the delimitation of maritime zones between Barbados 
and Trinidad and Tobago, and not between either of the parties and any 
third state; and finally that the Tribunal’s award did not prejudice the 
position of any state in respect of any such boundary.115  
The award rendered by the Tribunal was the first maritime boundary arbi-
tration award established under the LOS Convention, and is particularly 
interesting in this regard. 
Method for maritime delimitation 
In its Award, the Tribunal did something rather extraordinary in the his-
tory of maritime boundary delimitation adjudications. In chapter V, 
‘Maritime Delimitation: General Considerations’, the Tribunal elaborated 
thoroughly on what comprises the applicable law under Article 74(1) and 
83(1). In so doing, it summed up and clarified former jurisprudence in 
order to substantiate the law of maritime delimitation under Articles 
74(1) and 83(1) of the LOS Convention de lege lata. It thereby sought to 
confine and consolidate the methodology that had evolved through deci-
sions of courts and arbitral tribunals in maritime delimitation disputes 
thus far.  
The Tribunal started by referring to the ‘identical and fundamentally 
equitable solution’ criterion for the delimitation of the EEZ and the con-
tinental shelf in Articles 74(1) and 83(1), respectively. This, according to 
the Tribunal, ‘imprecise formula’ allowed for a broad range of considera-
tions of the rules embodied in treaties, customary law and general princi-
ples of law, as well as contributions by courts and tribunals and learned 
writers in the field of maritime delimitation.116  
The Tribunal went on to reaffirm the basic premise for all maritime de-
limitation: the entitlement of a state to a given maritime area, in this case 
both an EEZ and to a continental shelf. The Tribunal then linked the his-
torical origin of the continental shelf, in which the entitlement found its 
basis in natural prolongation (as in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases) 
to the subsequent emergence of the EEZ, where the entitlement was 
based on a distance criterion from the coast of 200 nm.117 In fact, accord-
ing to the Tribunal, the concept of distance as the basis of entitlement had 
become increasingly intertwined with that of natural prolongation.118 As 
evidence for this view, the Tribunal referred to Article 76, where the two 
concepts were assigned complementary roles – the right to a 200 nm con-
tinental shelf, and, on condition that defined criteria are met, the right to a 
continental shelf extending beyond that limit.119 Further, the same inter-
connection is found in Article 56 as regards the EEZ, distance being the 
sole basis of the coastal state’s entitlement to both the seabed and subsoil 
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and the superjacent waters.120 Thus, in the view of the Tribunal, both the 
continental shelf and the EEZ co-existed with significant elements in 
common arising from the fact that 200 nm from a state’s baselines dis-
tance is the basis for the entitlement to each of them.121  
This trend towards harmonization, as the Tribunal pointed out, led to the 
situation where states sought to establish single maritime boundaries 
delimiting both the continental shelf and the EEZ by one single line. In 
fact, it was evident in the Tribunal’s view that state practice with very 
few exceptions had overwhelmingly resorted to the establishment of sin-
gle maritime boundary lines, and that courts and tribunals had endorsed 
this practice either by determining a single maritime boundary or by 
determining lines that are theoretically separate but in fact coincident.122  
According to the Tribunal, this development made the law of maritime 
delimitation more complex, as it dealt with the specific criteria applicable 
to effect delimitation. In this regard, the Tribunal held that initially courts 
and tribunals had been naturally reluctant to give preference to those ele-
ments more closely connected to the continental shelf over those more 
closely related to the EEZ, or vice versa. This eventually led to the quest 
for a neutral criterion of a geographical character, which in the end pre-
vailed over area-specific criteria such as geomorphological aspects or 
resource-specific criteria such as the distribution of fish stocks, with a 
very few exceptions, as in the Greenland/Jan Mayen case.123 The Tribunal 
held that the Greenland/Jan Mayen case was most exceptional in having 
determined the line of delimitation in connection with the fisheries con-
ducted by the parties in dispute. As it was further held, ‘courts and tri-
bunals have not altogether excluded the role of this factor but, as in the 
Gulf of Maine case, have restricted its application to circumstances in 
which catastrophic results might follow from the adoption of a particular 
line.’124 
Also the search for a generally acceptable legal approach to maritime 
delimitation contributed to the complexity. The Tribunal held that, since 
the very outset of maritime delimitation, courts and tribunals have taken 
into account considerations of equity in reaching a determination of a 
boundary line over maritime areas. Yet, as equitable considerations per se 
are an imprecise concept, this led to confusion on the matter in light of 
the need for stability and certainty in the outcome of a legal process.125 
This confusion subsequently led to the search for ‘predictable, 
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objectively-determined criteria for delimitation, as opposed to subjective 
findings lacking precise legal or methodological bases, emphasized that 
the role of equity lies within and not beyond law.’126 Here the Tribunal 
mentioned various criteria that had emerged and which might or might 
not be appropriate for effecting delimitation in light of the specific cir-
cumstances in each case. Those were: (i) the identification of the relevant 
coasts abutting upon areas to be delimited; (ii) the principle of equidis-
tance as a method of delimitation applicable in certain geographical cir-
cumstances; (iii) the principle that delimitation should avoid the en-
croachment by one party on the natural prolongation of the other or its 
equivalent in respect of the EEZ; (iv) avoidance, to the extent possible, of 
interrupting the maritime projection of the relevant coastlines; and (v) 
consideration ensuring that any disproportionate outcome should be cor-
rected.127 Although this list is not exhaustive, it may be seen as setting the 
bar for what may be deemed relevant circumstances in future maritime 
delimitation disputes, especially those involving single maritime bound-
aries in which the ‘neutral criterion’ applies.  
The Tribunal summarized its findings as follows: 
The determination of the line of delimitation thus normally follows 
a two-step approach. First, a provisional line of equidistance is 
posited as a hypothesis and a practical starting point. While a con-
venient starting point, equidistance alone will in many circum-
stances not ensure an equitable result in the light of the peculiar-
ities of each specific case. The second step accordingly requires 
the examination of this provisional line in the light of relevant cir-
cumstances, which are case specific, so as to determine whether it 
is necessary to adjust the provisional equidistance line in order to 
achieve an equitable result.128 
Thus, also in the second case where the LOS Convention was applicable 
as between the parties, the method employed was the corrective/equity 
approach. 
Consideration of relevant circumstances 
The area to be delimited was separated into three areas: east, west and a 
central segment. In the relatively short central segment of approximately 
16 nm, the parties made no contentions as to adjusting the provisional 
equidistance line. Consequently, the Tribunal concluded that the equi-
distance line was agreed to in this segment of the single maritime bound-
ary.  
Delimitation in the west  
In the west, it was common ground between the parties that the line of 
delimitation was to be found in the equidistance line between their 
opposite coasts. Nevertheless, the parties disagreed as to whether the pro-
visional equidistance line should be adjusted taking into account relevant 
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circumstances. Barbados contended that the line had to be adjusted south-
wards just off the coasts of the island of Tobago, basing its argument on 
three core submissions: (i) the fact that Barbadian fisherfolk for centuries 
have fished in the waters off the coast of Tobago; (ii) that they their 
livelihoods were critically dependent on continued access to the fishery 
resources in these waters; (iii) and finally that the fisherfolk of Trinidad 
and Tobago were not dependent on fishery in these waters. 129 Nonethe-
less, the Tribunal dismissed Barbados’ contentions, on grounds of not 
finding any of the invoked factual circumstances proved.130 Hence, it con-
cluded that the single maritime boundary in the western segment was that 
of the provisional equidistance line. In addition, it decided that Trinidad 
and Tobago was obliged to negotiate in good faith an agreement with 
Barbados that would give Barbados access to fisheries within the EEZ of 
Trinidad and Tobago.131  
Delimitation in the east 
In the eastern segment, the parties did not agree as to whether the bound-
aries should consist of a single maritime boundary or of separate bound-
aries for the EEZ and for the continental shelf.132 The Tribunal held that 
this question was largely theoretical, as Trinidad and Tobago, which had 
claimed the boundary to be delimited separately, had also accepted that 
there was no de facto reason for the Tribunal to draw different boundary 
lines for the EEZ and for the continental shelf within the 200 nm of its 
baselines.133 Trinidad and Tobago’s need for a separate boundary line ap-
peared, in the view of the Tribunal, to be associated with its claim over 
the outer continental shelf beyond its 200 nm area.134 For these reasons, 
the Tribunal stated that it would first determine a single maritime bound-
ary for the delimitation of both the EEZ and the continental shelf to the 
extent of the overlapping claims, without prejudice to the question of the 
separate legal existence of the EEZ and of the continental shelf.135  
Concerning the law applicable to maritime delimitation, the parties con-
curred that the delimitation was to be effected by resort to the corrective/ 
equity approach.136 However, whereas Barbados contended that the equi-
distance/special circumstances method was the proper method prescribed 
by international law, Trinidad and Tobago claimed that the equidistance 
method was not a compulsory method of delimitation; further, that there 
was no presumption that the equidistance method should be the govern-
ing principle.137 In this respect, the Tribunal held that: 
…while no method of delimitation can be considered of and by 
itself compulsory, and no court or tribunal has so held, the need to 
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avoid subjective determinations requires that the method used start 
with a measure of certainty that equidistance positively ensures, 
subject to its subsequent correction if justified.138 
Thus, the Tribunal upheld the argument laid down in the Cameroon/ 
Nigeria case, in which resort to the corrective/equity approach under Arti-
cles 74(1) and 83(2) was not seen as being compulsory. However, the 
Tribunal clarified this view by stating that the application of a different 
method than the corrective/equity approach required the parties to ask for 
such specifically; moreover, that it required a well-founded justifica-
tion.139 Thus, the Tribunal strengthened the corrective/equity approach by 
making it presumptive, unlike in the Cameroon/Nigeria case, where it 
was held that this approach in fact not was presumptive. Accordingly, by 
making the corrective/equity approach presumptive, the Tribunal 
strengthened the rule of maritime delimitation law in the direction of pre-
dictability. As the stipulated requirements for another approach were not 
met, the delimitation was to be determined by the equidistance/special 
circumstances method.  
Trinidad and Tobago offered four arguments for adjusting the provisional 
equidistance northwards: (i) distinction between the ‘Caribbean sector’ 
and the ‘Atlantic Sector’, as the former sector was characterized by oppo-
siteness and the latter by adjacency;140 (ii) the relevant coasts and their 
projection; (iii) proportionality; (iv) regional considerations. 
The Tribunal did not agree on the distinction between the ‘Caribbean 
sector’ and the ‘Atlantic sector’, but held that: 
…the applicable law under UNCLOS is the same in either case: 
Articles 74 and 83 do not distinguish between opposite and adja-
cent coasts. It follows that there is no justification to approach the 
process of delimitation from the perspective of a distinction be-
tween opposite and adjacent coasts and apply different criteria to 
each, which in essence is the purpose of the two sectors argu-
ment.141 
This view affirmed the approach of using the corrective/equity method in 
situations of both opposite and adjacent coasts, as first applied in the 
scenario with opposite coasts in the Greenland/Jan Mayen case, and then 
in the scenario with adjacent coasts in the Qatar/Bahrain case and the 
subsequent Cameroon/Nigeria case. 
Next for consideration were the relevant coasts and their projection. The 
Tribunal found no difficulty in concluding that coastal frontages were a 
circumstance relevant to the delimitation and that their relative lengths 
might require an adjustment of the provisional equidistance line.142 Sec-
ondly, the Tribunal agreed that the coastal frontages of Trinidad and 
Tobago had a clearly easterly orientation, and were a relevant circum-
stance to be taken into account in adjusting the equidistance line.143  
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As regards proportionality, Barbados contested that proportionality could 
be used as an independent method of delimitation.144 In this respect, the 
Tribunal concluded: 
…proportionality is a relevant circumstance to be taken into con-
sideration in reviewing the equity of a tentative delimitation, but 
not in any way to require the application of ratios or mathematical 
determinations in the attribution of maritime areas.145 
Thus the role of proportionality was to examine in the final outcome of 
the delimitation effected, as the final test to ensure that equitableness was 
not contradicted by a disproportionate result.146 Before the Tribunal could 
proceed with the proportionality test, it therefore had to examine Trinidad 
and Tobago’s last claim for adjusting the equidistance line. Trinidad and 
Tobago held that other agreements delimiting the sea in the region had to 
be taken into account in order to avoid a cut-off effect.147 In this respect, 
the Tribunal ruled that the treaty between France (Guadeloupe and Mar-
tinique) and Dominica in the region north of Barbados, and the Barbados/ 
Guyana Joint Cooperation Zone Treaty, could have no effect on the pre-
sent dispute.148 Yet, the Tribunal was bound to take into account the 
treaty between Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela in so far as it deter-
mined what the maritime claims of Trinidad and Tobago might be.149 
Thus, it held that in so far as Trinidad and Tobago’s claim was con-
cerned, the maximum extent of overlapping areas between the parties was 
partly determined by the treaty between Trinidad and Tobago and Vene-
zuela.150 In relation to this, Barbados contended that Trinidad and Tobago 
could not claim an adjustment of the equidistance line to the north be-
cause that state had consistently recognized and acquiesced in Barbados’ 
exercise of sovereignty in the area.151 Although seismic surveys 
sporadically authorizing oil concessions in the area and patrolling were 
relevant, that did not provide sufficient evidence to establish estoppel or 
acquiescence.152 Hence the Tribunal did not find this activity to be of 
decisive legal significance.153 
Based on the above considerations, the Tribunal adjusted the provisional 
equidistance line. It concluded that the appropriate point of deflection 
was the point that gave effect to the presence of the coastal frontages of 
both the islands of Trinidad and of Tobago, thus taking into account a 
circumstance that would otherwise be ignored by an unadjusted equidis-
tance line.154 This point was located where the provisional equidistance 
line meets the geodetic line joining (a) the archipelagic baseline turning-
point on Little Tobago Island with (b) the point of intersection of Trini-
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dad and Tobago’s southern maritime boundary with its 200 nm EEZ 
limit.155 Then a straight line was drawn from this point in the direction of 
its terminal point, where the delimitation line intersected the Trinidad and 
Tobago-Venezuela agreed maritime boundary, which was the southern-
most limit of the area claimed by Trinidad and Tobago.156 
Finally, the Tribunal applied the test of proportionality. It concluded that 
the bending of the equidistance line reflected a reasonable influence of 
the coastal frontages on the overall area of delimitation, with a view to 
avoiding reciprocal encroachments that would otherwise result in some 
form of inequity.157 
Conclusion 
The Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award is unusual in respect to earlier 
jurisprudence on maritime delimitation, and in this case it is also there-
fore important. The Tribunal, openly and honestly, acknowledged that 
earlier attempts by international courts and tribunals to define the role of 
equity had resulted in distancing the outcome from the role of law, 
leading to a state of confusion in the matter. This brings us back to the 
two diverging schools of thought that emerged in the shaping of the law 
of maritime delimitation in the first half of the 20th century. As we have 
seen, courts and tribunals have at times employed the corrective/equity 
approach and other times adopted the result-oriented equity approach, 
without properly explaining why. Yet, as the study so far has shown, 
there has been an increasing tendency towards the use of the corrective/ 
equity approach, first in situations with opposite coasts, and then finally 
to situations with adjacent coasts. The Tribunal also affirmed this tend-
ency in the present case. In the Tribunal’s view, it was necessary to 
search for an approach that could accommodate both the need for predict-
ability and stability within the rule of law and the need for flexibility in 
the outcome. According to the Tribunal, the method that met those 
requirements was the corrective/equity approach, in which the court or 
tribunal first draws a provisional equidistance line, and then at the second 
stage asks if any special circumstances call for an adjustment of that line. 
In the words of the Tribunal, ‘certainty [was] thus combined with the 
need for an equitable result.’158 
As in the Cameroon/Nigeria case, the Tribunal affirmed that the correc-
tive/equity approach under Articles 74(1) and 83(2) was not compulsory. 
But contrary to the Cameroon/Nigeria case, the Tribunal concluded that 
the application of a method other than the corrective/equity approach re-
quired the parties to ask for such specifically; moreover, that this required 
a well-founded justification. Thus, the Tribunal strengthened the correc-
tive/equity approach by holding it as presumptive. 
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The Tribunal also made some important remarks to the development in 
jurisprudence of, and increasing will of states to establish, a single mari-
time boundary delimiting the various zones by a single line. In the Tri-
bunal’s view, both the continental shelf and the EEZ co-exist in the LOS 
Convention, with significant elements in common arising from the fact 
that the distance criterion provides the basis for the entitlement to both of 
them. This co-existence led to the adoption in case law of a neutral cri-
terion, in which geographical aspects prevail, rather than area-specific 
criteria like geomorphological aspects or resource-specific criteria like 
the distribution of fish stocks. 
In relation to the relevant circumstances to be taken into account, the 
Tribunal held that the process of achieving an equitable result is con-
strained by legal principle, in particular concerning the factors that may 
be taken into account. Here the Tribunal held that it was necessary that 
the delimitation be ‘consistent with legal principle as established in de-
cided cases, in order that States in other disputes be assisted in the nego-
tiations in search of an equitable solution that are required by Articles 74 
or 83 of the Convention.’159  
2.6.3 The Nicaragua vs Honduras Case (2007) 
On 8 December 1999 Nicaragua initiated proceedings against Honduras 
in relation to their maritime boundary dispute in the Caribbean Sea.160 
Nicaragua invoked the declarations whereby both countries had accepted 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ pursuant to Article 36(2) of the 
Court’s Statutes, and Article XXXI of the American Treaty on Pacific 
Settlement, also known as the ‘Pact of Bogotá’.161 The Court’s jurisdic-
tion was not contested by Honduras. The maritime dispute also involved 
the question of sovereignty over certain islands in the disputed area. As 
the issue of sovereignty was not requested in the initial petition, however, 
the Court could have refused to consider it. Notwithstanding, the Court 
concluded it had jurisdiction to decide the sovereignty of the islands, as 
its jurisdiction to do so had to be considered inherent in the initial 
claim.162 The basis for this inference was that the islands were located 
within the disputed area to be delimited. On the basis of post-colonial 
conduct (effectivités), the Court determined that Honduras has sovereign-
ty over the islands.163 
Method for maritime delimitation 
Nicaragua argued that the boundary should be the bisector of the lines 
representing the coastal fronts of the two parties.164 Honduras, on the 
other hand, argued that: (i) based on the principle of uti possidetis juris165 
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and a prior tacit agreement, the boundary should follow the 15th parallel, 
and (ii) if that line was not accepted, the boundary should be an adjusted 
equidistance line.166 The parties agreed that the boundary of their terri-
torial seas, EEZs and continental shelves should be effected by one single 
maritime boundary.167 
The Court started with the claim of Honduras that the boundary should be 
based on the principle of uti possidetis juris. The Court acknowledged 
that the principle might, in certain circumstances – as in connection with 
historical bays and territorial seas – play a role in maritime delimita-
tion.168 However, finding no evidence that Spain in colonial times had 
divided its maritime jurisdiction between the provinces of Honduras and 
Nicaragua, even within the limits of the territorial sea, the Court had to 
reject Honduras’ contention.169  
Next to be considered by the Court was the claim of Honduras that there 
was a tacit agreement between the parties that the 15th parallel constituted 
de facto their maritime boundary. Here the Court held that ‘evidence of a 
tacit agreement must be compelling’ and that ‘the establishment of a 
permanent boundary is matter of grave importance and agreement is not 
easily to be presumed.’170 The Court found, after having considered the 
evidence of a tacit agreement laid down for it, that while the 15th parallel 
appeared to have had some relevance in the conduct of the parties, there 
was ‘no tacit agreement…of a nature to establish a legally binding mari-
time boundary.’171 
Having found that there was no traditional boundary along the line of the 
15th parallel, the Court turned to the determination of the maritime bound-
ary. It declared that even though Nicaragua was not party to the LOS 
Convention when submitting the case, the LOS Convention was the ap-
plicable law between them in this dispute, as both parties were in agree-
ment on this and now had become state parties to it.172 The area to be 
delimited by a single maritime boundary stretched from the mainland 
coast to at least the 82nd meridian, where third-state interests could be-
come relevant. 
The Court then began by explaining the law that had evolved in regard to 
single maritime boundaries and reiterated the ‘neutral criterion’ first 
adapted in the Qatar /Bahrain case and later used when drawing single 
maritime boundaries. It also found reason to differentiate that criterion, as 
applied in situations in which a single line was to delimit that of the con-
tinental shelf and the EEZ, from situations in which the area also 
involved the territorial sea. When delimiting the territorial sea the Court 
had first and foremost to apply ‘the principles and rules of international 
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customary law which refer to the delimitation of the territorial sea, while 
taking into account that its ultimate task is to draw a single maritime 
boundary that serves other purposes as well.’173  
The Court then turned to Article 15 of the LOS Convention, according to 
which the boundary between the overlapping territorial seas of neigh-
bouring states is to be an equidistance line, except where historical or 
other special circumstances make it necessary to delimit the boundary 
differently. In relation to this the Court explained why the equidistance/ 
special circumstances or the corrective/equity approach had widely been 
used for boundary delimitation, but went on to observe that the ‘equidis-
tance method does not automatically have priority over other methods of 
boundary delimitation and, in particular circumstances, there may be fac-
tors which make the application of the equidistance method inappropri-
ate.’174  
The latter was the situation in that case. First of all, neither of the parties 
had as its main argument the use of the equidistance/special circumstan-
ces method.175 Further, because of the sharply convex projection of Cape 
Gracias a Dios at the terminus of the land boundary, ‘the pair of base 
points at the tip of the Cape would assume a considerable dominance in 
constructing an equidistance line, especially as it travels out from the 
coast.’176 Moreover, ‘given the close proximity of these base points to 
each other, any variation or error in situating them would become dis-
proportionately magnified in the resulting equidistance line.’177 Further, 
the changing shape and accretion of the delta at the mouth of the River 
Coco, where their land boundary ends, ‘might render any equidistance 
line so constructed today arbitrary and unreasonable in the near future.’178 
In addition came the fact that the parties disagreed as to sovereignty over 
unstable islands formed in the delta.  
The Court considered that these geographical and geomorphological fea-
tures constituted special circumstances within the meaning of Article 15 
of the LOS Convention. Yet, what the Court found impossible was not 
the application of these features as special circumstances per se, but the 
very application of the equidistance method itself and the drawing of a 
provisional equidistance line as prescribed by Article 15. The Court con-
sidered that the facts in the present case gave reason for exemption from 
the general rule of the equidistance/special circumstances method, as pre-
scribed by Article 15.179 It drew support for those conclusions from the 
International Law Commission’s commentary on the draft article that 
became Article 12 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea 
and the Contiguous Zone, which is virtually identical to Article 15 of the 
LOS Convention.180 The Court noted, however, that even if special cir-
cumstances now required the use of another method, ‘equidistance 
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remains the general rule.’181 Thus, for the first time in history where the 
LOS Convention has been the applicable law between the parties, the 
equidistance/special circumstance or the equity/corrective approach was 
not considered the appropriate method.  
Next for consideration was what alternative method should be used. 
While Honduras’ claims in regard to the boundary to be drawn had both 
been rejected, Nicaragua’s claim for the use of the bisector line had not 
yet been processed. Thus the Court turned to consider whether in princi-
ple some form of bisector of the angle created by lines representing the 
relevant mainland coasts could serve as the basis for the delimitation.182 It 
noted that ‘the use of a bisector—the line formed by bisecting the angle 
created by the linear approximations of coastlines—has proved to be a 
viable substitute method in certain circumstances where equidistance is 
not possible or appropriate.’183 And further, ‘that in instances where, as in 
the present case, any base points that could be determined by the Court 
are inherently unstable, the bisector method may be seen as an approxi-
mation of the equidistance method.’184 The Court considered that the use 
of the bisector method was indeed justified in the present case because of 
the geographical configuration of the coast and the geomorphological 
features of the area where the terminus of the land boundary was 
located.185 
Next to be considered was which of the various possibilities for the coast-
al fronts could be used to define these linear approximations of the rele-
vant geography. The Court rejected Nicaragua’s proposal in this regard, 
as it would cut off a significant portion of Honduran territory.186 Instead 
the Court found that the front extending from Punta Patuca to Wouhnta 
would avoid the problem of cutting off Honduran territory, while provid-
ing a coastal façade of sufficient length to account properly for the coast-
al configuration in the disputed area. Accordingly, a Honduran coastal 
front running to Punta Patuca and a Nicaraguan coastal front running to 
Wouhnta were, in the Court’s view, relevant for drawing the bisector.187 
Having identified the bisector line as the appropriate method for maritime 
delimitation, the Court proceeded with the delimitation of the waters 
around and between the islands in question. According to the Court, each 
island should have a 12-nm territorial sea, but no other zone, since neither 
Honduras nor Nicaragua had requested any such zone.188 The Court 
rejected Nicaragua’s contention that that each island should have a three 
nautical miles enclave of territorial sea in order to prevent Honduras from 
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obtaining a disproportionate share of the area in dispute, as would result 
from giving the islands a 12 nm territorial sea.189  
According to the Court, the boundary should deviate from the bisector 
line southwards around the four islands and in principle 12 nm from 
them. However, the 12 nm territorial sea around three of the islands over-
lapped with the 12 nm territorial sea of the Nicaraguan island of Edin-
burgh Cay, lying to the south.190  
As there were no special circumstances present in this area, the Court 
found that the territorial sea boundary line between the three Honduran 
islands and the Nicaraguan Edinburgh Cay should be the equidistance 
line.191 West of the most westerly Honduran island of South Cay, the 
Court decided that the boundary should resume along the bisector line 
where the 12-mile arch around South Cay intersects with the bisector line 
initially drawn from the mainland.192 
Finally, the Court had to determine the starting and end points of the 
single maritime boundary. It set the starting point three nautical miles out 
to the sea, along the azimuth of the bisector line from the point deter-
mined by the Mixed Boundary Commission in 1962 as the terminus of 
the land boundary between Honduras and Nicaragua.193 Furthermore, as 
the parties had requested, the Court decided they should agree on the line 
which linked the end of the land boundary as fixed by an earlier arbitral 
award of 1906 and the point of departure of the maritime delimitation in 
accordance with the present judgment (three nautical miles out in the 
sea).194 As for the end point of the boundary, the Court decided that the 
boundary should extend as far as the area where the rights of third states 
might be affected.195 Unlike in the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago case, in 
which the Tribunal considered itself competent to delimit the continental 
shelf boundary beyond 200 nm, the Court in this case determined that the 
boundary should in no case extend beyond 200 nm; further: ‘any claim of 
continental shelf rights beyond 200 miles must be in accordance with 
Article 76 of UNCLOS and reviewed by the Commission on the Limits 
of the Continental Shelf established thereunder.’196 
Conclusion 
The Nicaragua/Honduras case was the first case in which the LOS Con-
vention was the applicable law between the parties and where the equi-
distance/special circumstance or the corrective/equity approach was not 
deemed the appropriate method for delimitation. This departure from 
previous case law, however, must be seen as an exception to the general 
rule of the equidistance/special circumstances method. As the Court 
explicitly stated, ‘equidistance remains the general rule’. We also have 
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seen that, when delimiting the maritime boundary between the islands, 
the Court reverted to the equidistance method.  
It is also worth noting that the Court’s decision to reject the equidistance 
method was made in relation to the territorial sea under Article 15, and 
not in relation to the EEZ and the continental shelf under Articles 74(1) 
and 83(1). The suitability of the bisector method for the delimitation of 
the EEZ and the continental shelf was not properly discussed by the 
Court. Indirectly, however, it should be understood that the factors that 
made an equidistance line inappropriate for a territorial sea boundary also 
made an equidistance line inappropriate as the starting point for the 
boundary of the EEZ and the continental shelf. This inference is sup-
ported by the Court’s consideration of the potentially distorting effect of 
the choice of base points in which, the further that that line travels from 
the coast, could assume considerable dominance when constructing the 
equidistance line.197 The Court also described the bisector method as an 
approximation of the equidistance method. Thus, the actual departure 
from the use of the equidistance method can be said to be minimal. More 
important are the reasons that the Court gave for not employing the 
equidistance method for most of the boundary. The Court upheld the line 
articulated by the Tribunal in the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago case, 
where it was held that the application of a different method than the use 
of the corrective-equity approach required the parties to ask for such spe-
cifically, and moreover, that it required a well-founded justification. In 
the present case neither of the parties had advocated the use of the equi-
distance method as their main argument.  
Finally, what justified the shift from the equidistance/special circumstan-
ces method were the rare circumstances of the case: the extreme convex-
ity of the coast at the terminus of the land boundary, and the constantly 
shifting delta of the River Coco. Hence the Court set the bar for using 
another method than that of the equidistance/special circumstance relativ-
ely high. 
2.6.4 The Guyana vs Surinam Award (2007) 
On 24 February 2004 Guyana initiated proceedings against Suriname in 
relation to three matters: (i) the delimitation of the territorial sea, the EEZ 
and the continental shelf by a single maritime boundary; (ii) whether or 
not Surinam had infringed its obligations under the LOS Convention, the 
UN Charter, and general international law to settle disputes by peaceful 
means, by using force against a drilling rig licensed by Guyana; (iii) 
whether or not Suriname had infringed Articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the 
LOS Convention in regard to its obligation to make every effort to enter 
into provisional arrangements pending agreement on a maritime 
boundary, and by jeopardizing or hampering the reaching of the final 
agreement.198 We will examine only the first point. 
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Guyana and Suriname ratified the LOS Convention on 16 November 
1993 and 9 July 1998, respectively.199 Neither party had made a declara-
tion pursuant to Article 287(1) of the LOS Convention regarding the 
choice of compulsory procedures.200 Thus, according to Article 287(3), 
the parties were deemed to have accepted arbitration in accordance with 
Annex VII of the LOS Convention. Furthermore, neither had made a 
declaration pursuant to Article 298 regarding optional exceptions to the 
applicability of the compulsory procedures provided for in Section 2 of 
Part XV.201 Thus, the parties were entitled under Article 286 of the 
Convention to pursue recourse to binding decisions under Section 2 of 
Part XV. Both agreed to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, but disagreed as to 
the scope of it.202 
Method for maritime delimitation  
Before the Tribunal could proceed with the delimitation of the territorial 
sea, it had to address a jurisdictional objection raised by Suriname. Suri-
name argued that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to establish the termin-
us of the land boundary and that without such a terminus there could be 
no maritime boundary. However, the Tribunal found that the terminus 
had been established by a boundary commission in 1936, and therefore 
there was no need to consider Suriname’s objection to jurisdiction fur-
ther.203 The Tribunal went on to state that the governing law was Article 
15 of the LOS Convention, which meant that the territorial sea boundary 
would be an equidistance line unless there were special circumstances.204 
As regards the delimitation of the EEZ and the continental shelf bound-
ary, the Tribunal pointed out that delimitation was governed by Articles 
74/1) and 83(1).205 However, the Tribunal noted that it had been asked to 
draw a single maritime boundary, and that the concept of such a boundary 
did not have its origins in the LOS Convention, but was ‘squarely based 
on State practice and the law as developed by international courts and 
tribunals.’206 Here the Tribunal referred to the dictums made in the Barba-
dos/Trinidad and Tobago case, as regards the relevant material to be 
taken into account when deciding the law de lege lata, and the extent of 
the Tribunal’s discretion in this respect.207 The Tribunal further held that: 
‘in the course of the last two decades international courts and tribunals 
dealing with disputes concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf 
and the exclusive economic zone have come to embrace a clear role for 
equidistance.’208 It cited earlier cases in this regard, and added: ‘it is 
important to note that recent decisions indicate that the presumption in 
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favour of the equidistance, established in case law relating to States with 
opposite coasts, also applies in the case of States with adjacent coasts.’209  
Thus the Tribunal concluded that the law under Articles 74(1) and 83(1) 
required a two-stage approach to boundary delimitation, in accordance 
with its precedents. The process should begin by positing a provisional 
equidistance which might, at the second stage, be adjusted in light of any 
relevant circumstances, if necessary to achieve an equitable solution.210  
The Tribunal proceeded to determine what coastlines were relevant for 
delimiting the provisional equidistance line. It found it logical and appro-
priate to treat as relevant the coasts of the parties which generated ‘the 
complete course’ of the provisional equidistance, and made reference to 
the Greenland/Jan Mayen case.211 In applying this inference the Tribunal 
found that on Guyana’s side the relevant coast ran from a point just sea-
ward of marker ‘B’ to Devonshire Castle Flats, and on Suriname’s side 
from Bluff Point on the east bank of the Corentyne River to a point on 
Vissers Bank.212  
As the Tribunal had not been requested to delimit maritime areas beyond 
200 nm from the baselines of Guyana and Suriname, the Tribunal was not 
concerned with matters concerning the delimitation of the outer contin-
ental shelf of the parties.213 
Consideration of special circumstances 
In considering special circumstances relevant to delimitation of the terri-
torial sea, the Tribunal first held that there was no evidence to suggest 
that some form of historic title to the territorial waters had inured to any 
of the parties, nor that there were any geographical features such as low-
tide elevations or islands to be considered in delimiting the territorial 
sea.214 It also made a note of the quantitative and qualitative circum-
stances to be considered in a maritime delimitation: that there was ‘no 
closed list of considerations’ or ‘finite list of special circumstances’; 
rather, the Tribunal was called upon to ‘examine every particular factor 
of the case which might suggest an adjustment or shifting of that line’.215  
Next for consideration was whether or not navigational interests of the 
Corentyne River could play a part as a special circumstance in the case. 
The Tribunal concluded that navigational interests indeed could consti-
tute a special circumstance and that they did so in the present case. In 
support of the view, it quoted the travaux préparatoires of the 1958 Ter-
ritorial Sea Convention, in particular, the International Law Commis-
sion’s commentary on what became Article 12 of that 1958 Convention, 
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as well as the Beagle Channel and English Channel arbitrations.216 The 
Tribunal found that the previous colonial powers (the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom) had agreed de facto on a line N10°E as the line of 
delimitation for the then three nautical miles territorial sea, as all of the 
Corentyne River was to be Surinamese territory.217 Furthermore, the line 
N10°E provided appropriate access for Guyana through Suriname’s terri-
torial sea to the western channel of navigation in the Corentyne River.218 
According to the Tribunal, those reasons justified an adjustment from the 
equidistance line.219 The Tribunal concluded that the boundary of the first 
three nautical miles of the territorial sea was to be the line N10°E starting 
from the intersection of the low-water line of the west bank of the Coren-
tyne River and the line N10°E that passes through marker ‘B’, a marker 
placed by the 1936 Mixed Boundary Commission 220 metres distant 
from marker ‘A’, which was established by the Commission as the term-
inus of the land boundary.220 
The Tribunal then turned to the remaining territorial sea boundary be-
tween three and twelve nautical miles. It noted that the question on how 
an existing territorial sea boundary was to be extended, in the absence of 
an agreement to do so, when states extended their territorial seas from 
three to twelve nautical miles, appeared not to have engaged attention in 
international jurisprudence, state practice or by commentators.221 The 
Tribunal rejected Suriname’s claim that the line N10°E should simply be 
extended beyond three nautical miles to form the boundary, and held in-
stead that it was ‘necessary to find a principled method’ by which the 
N10°E line could be connected to starting point of the single maritime 
boundary delimiting the EEZ and the continental shelf.222 The Tribunal 
concluded by establishing the shortest line drawn diagonally from the 
point at which the N10°E line intersected the three nautical miles limit to 
the starting point of the single maritime boundary of EEZ and the contin-
ental shelf.223 
Having delimited the maritime boundary of the territorial sea, the Tribun-
al proceeded with the consideration of special circumstances in relation to 
the single maritime boundary of the EEZ and the continental shelf. 
Neither of the parties considered the provisional equidistance line to rep-
resent an equitable delimitation. Suriname argued that the geographical 
situation in the area would lead to a cut-off effect on the projection of its 
coastal front if the equidistance method were applied. It therefore urged 
that instead of the equidistance line, the boundary should be the bisector 
of the angle formed by the coastal fronts of Guyana and Suriname, and 
referred to former jurisprudence in which this method had been used.224 
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The Tribunal, however, rejected the use of the bisector method, observing 
that the ‘general configuration of the maritime area to be delimited does 
not present the type of geographical peculiarities which could lead the 
Tribunal to adopt a methodology at variance with that which has been 
practised by international courts and tribunals during the past two 
decades.’225 Furthermore, it found that there were no other geographical 
circumstances that required any modification of the equidistance line, as 
the relevant coastlines presented no ‘marked concavity or convexity.’226 
Guyana had argued that the equidistance line should be modified because 
the pattern of oil and gas concessions by the parties for nearly 50 years 
indicated a modus vivendi that a modified equidistance line should form 
the boundary.227 However, the Tribunal considered the jurisprudence of 
international courts and tribunals to reveal a ‘marked reluctance’ on the 
part of courts and tribunals ‘to accord significance to the oil practice of 
the parties in the determination of the delimitation line.’228 In the present 
case the Tribunal found ‘no evidence of any agreement between the 
Parties’ in the practice of awarding concessions, and therefore such prac-
tice would not be taken into account.229 Finally, the Tribunal dismissed as 
irrelevant the contention by Guyana that it should take account of the 
maritime boundary proposed in a draft agreement between Suriname and 
France for the boundary between Suriname and French Guiana.230 Ac-
cordingly, the Tribunal concluded that there were no relevant circumstan-
ces that required adjustment of the equidistance line.231 
The Tribunal also noted that it had checked the relevant coastal lengths 
for proportionality and arrived at nearly the same ratio as for the relevant 
areas (51:49, 54:46 respectively, in Guyana’s favour). The areas resulting 
from the use of the equidistance line were therefore proportionate in the 
Tribunal’s view.232 
Conclusion 
The Guyana/Suriname case followed the line of its recent precedents in 
adopting the two-stage approach or the corrective/equity approach when 
delimiting the territorial sea and a single maritime boundary for the EEZ 
and the continental shelf. In contrast to the Nicaragua/Honduras case, the 
Tribunal in this case rejected a proposition to use the bisector method 
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instead of the equidistance method. Its reasoning in this regard strength-
ens the presumption of the equidistance method in relation to single mari-
time boundaries and provides a further clarification of its role in maritime 
delimitation. The Tribunal further strengthened the role of the equidis-
tance method by reiterating the view that recent case law had indicated 
‘that the presumption in favour of the equidistance, established in case 
law relating to States with opposite coasts, also applies in the case of 
States with adjacent coasts.’233 It also upheld the ‘neutral criterion’ adop-
ted in previous cases in regard to the drawing of single maritime 
boundaries. Having cited earlier cases, it simply held that ‘international 
courts and tribunals dealing with maritime delimitation should be mindful 
of not remaking or wholly refashioning nature, but should in a sense 
respect nature.’234 
2.6.5 The Romania vs Ukraine Case (2009) 
On 16 September 2004 Romania instituted proceedings against Ukraine 
concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf and the EEZs of these 
two states in the Black Sea.235 Romania invoked as basis for the ICJ’s 
jurisdiction Article 36(h), paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court, and 
paragraph 4(h) of the Additional Agreement to the Treaty on Good 
Neighbourliness and Co-operation, which the parties had concluded on 2 
June 1997.236 The parties were in agreement that the conditions for the 
Court’s jurisdiction were satisfied; however, they differed to the exact 
scope of it.237 Both parties agreed that delimitation should result in a 
single maritime boundary for the EEZ and the continental shelf.238  
Ukraine argued that the jurisdiction of the Court concerned only the 
delimitation of the continental shelf and the EEZ, not the territorial sea, 
as only the former two were the zones explicitly referred to in the above-
mentioned treaty and agreement.239 Thus, Ukraine contested the first 
segment of Romania’s boundary claim, i.e. the line between point F and 
point X which followed the 12 nm arch outer limit of the territorial sea of 
Serpents’ Island, which belongs to Ukraine. The Court approved 
Ukraine’s contention that it had ‘no jurisdiction to delimit the territorial 
seas of the Parties’, but, at the same time, it opposed the view that it was 
therefore prevented from delimiting ‘on the one hand, the exclusive 
economic zone and the continental shelf of one State, and, on the other 
hand, the territorial sea of the other State at its seaward limit.’240 
Romania and Ukraine had ratified the LOS Convention on 17 December 
1997 and 26 July 1999, respectively. Thus, the applicable provisions for 
delimiting the EEZ continental shelf between the parties were Articles 
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74(1) and 83(1) of that Convention.241 Romania held, however, that 
previous agreements between the parties had to be taken into account, as 
they defined procedures and principles for the negotiation of a single 
maritime boundary between them. According to Romania, those agree-
ments had to be interpreted within the meaning of Articles 74(4) and 
83(4), but this was rejected by the Court.242 According to the Court, the 
principles and procedures referred to in those agreements were applicable 
only to the negotiations between the parties. As regards the present case, 
they were relevant only to the extent that they formed ‘part of the relevant 
rules of international law.’243 Therefore, the Court held that what was 
applicable law in the present case were the relevant provisions of the 
LOS Convention as interpreted in its jurisprudence.244  
Method for maritime delimitation 
The Court started by dealing with a disagreement between the parties as 
to whether there already existed an agreed maritime boundary around 
Serpents’ Island for all purposes (this island belongs to Ukraine and is 
located only 20 nm east of the mainland coast of Ukraine). The disagree-
ment also concerned the starting point of the delimitation of the EEZ and 
the continental shelf in the present case. The Court found that Article 1 of 
the 2003 State Border Regime Treaty established the starting point for the 
present delimitation by determining the end point of the parties’ territorial 
sea boundary.245 The Court also found that there was an agreed maritime 
boundary around Serpents’ Island in the form of a 12 nm arc establishing 
the territorial sea of the island.246 This maritime boundary did not delimit 
the territorial sea of Ukraine and the EEZ and continental shelf of Rom-
ania, and consequently did not forfeit possible entitlement by Ukraine to 
maritime zones beyond the 12 nm limit.247 Thus, Ukraine’s entitlement to 
a continental shelf and an EEZ around Serpents’ Island was still intact.  
Next was the determination of relevant coastlines and maritime areas 
pertaining to each of the parties in the delimitation process. According to 
the Court, the role of relevant coasts served mainly two legal aspects in 
the delimitation of the EEZ and the continental shelf. Firstly, it was 
necessary in order to determine, regarding the specific context of the 
case, what coastlines constituted the overlapping claims to those zones.248 
Here the Court reiterated the ‘land dominates the sea’ principle previous-
ly adapted by courts and tribunals, in which ‘the land is the legal source 
of the power which a State may exercise over territorial extensions 
seaward’ and that the ‘coast of the territory of the State is the decisive 
factor for title to submarine areas adjacent to it.’249 Secondly, the relevant 
coasts would have to be ascertained in order to check, in the third and 
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final stage of the delimitation process, whether there existed any 
disproportionality in the ratios of the coastal length of each state and the 
maritime areas falling to either side of the delimitation line.250 
The Court decided that the whole Romanian coast, from the terminus of 
the boundary with Ukraine to the terminus of the land boundary with 
Bulgaria, constituted the relevant coast for the purpose of delimitation, as 
the parties were in agreement on this.251 As regards the relevant Ukrainian 
coast, the Court decided that most of Ukraine’s mainland coast was rele-
vant, from the terminus of the land boundary with Romania, to the 
southern tip of the Crimean Peninsula. What was not deemed as relevant 
coast was that of the Karkinits’ka Gulf, in which the coasts faced each 
other and did not project into the area to be delimited.252 Further, the 
Court found that the coast of Serpents’ Island was ‘so short that that it 
[made] no real difference to the overall length of the relevant coasts of 
the Parties.’253 Accordingly, the Court arrived at a coastal length ratio 
between Romania and Ukraine of 1:2.8.254 As the relevant maritime area, 
the Court included all the waters in which maritime entitlements of 
Ukraine and Romania overlapped with each other, omitting the waters of 
the Karkinits’ka Gulf.255  
The court then turned to the delimitation methodology. It held that when 
called upon to delimit the continental shelf or the EEZ, or to draw a sin-
gle maritime boundary as in the present case, the Court proceeds in de-
fined stages which in recent decades have been ‘defined with precision’. 
It explicated this view: 
First, the Court will establish a provisional delimitation line, using 
methods that are geometrically objective and also appropriate for 
the geography of the area in which the delimitation is to take place. 
So far as delimitation between adjacent coasts is concerned, an 
equidistance line will be drawn unless there are compelling rea-
sons that make this unfeasible in the particular case…So far as 
opposite coasts are concerned, the provisional delimitation line 
will consist of a median line between the two coasts.256 
Secondly, as the final line should result in an equitable solution according 
to Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of the LOS Convention, the Court would at 
next consider whether there were any factors in the case calling for an 
adjustment of the provisional equidistance line in order to achieve an 
equitable result.257  
In the third and final stage, the Court would check if, after having taken 
into consideration special circumstances, the line would lead to an in-
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equitable result by reason of great disproportionality of maritime areas.258 
This was not to suggest that the respective area should be proportionate to 
coastal lengths. The Court quoted the Greenland/Jan Mayen case in this 
regard, where it was held that ‘the sharing out of the area is therefore the 
consequence of the delimitation, not vice versa.’259 
The Court also reiterated what had been held in the Nicaragua/Honduras 
case: ‘when the line to be drawn covers several zones of coincident juris-
dictions, the so-called equitable principles/relevant circumstances method 
may usefully be applied, as in these maritime zones this method is also 
suited to achieving an equitable result.’260  
Before constructing the provisional equidistance line, the Court had to 
determine the base points, so as to ‘identify the appropriate points on the 
parties’ relevant coast or coasts which mark a significant change in the 
direction of the coast, in such a way that the geometrical figure formed by 
the line connecting all these points reflects the general direction of the 
coastlines.’261 The Court eliminated Serpents’ Island as a source of base 
points on Ukraine’s coast, holding that to ‘count Serpents’ Island as a 
relevant part of the coast would amount to grafting an extraneous element 
onto Ukraine’s coastline; the consequence would be a judicial refashion-
ing of geography, which neither the law nor practice of maritime delimit-
ation authorizes.’262 Further, the Court eliminated the base points on the 
seaward end of Romania’s 7.5 km long Sulina dyke and substituted it 
instead with a base point on the landward end of the dyke.263 The Court 
found the provisional equidistance line to be governed by two base points 
on the Romanian coast and by three base points on the Ukrainian coast, 
constructing a line with turning points A-B-C.264 From the last turning 
point C, the equidistance line continued in a southerly direction until the 
point at which the interests of third states could become affected – which 
was not specified further. The line drawn by the Court coincided with 
neither that drawn by Romania nor that drawn by Ukraine. 
Consideration of special circumstances 
Having constructed the provisional equidistance line, the Court proceeded 
to the consideration of relevant circumstances that might call for an 
adjustment of this line. The Court found these to include the dispropor-
tion of coastal lengths, the enclosed nature of the Black Sea and existing 
maritime delimitations in the region, the presence of Serpents’ Island in 
the delimitation area, the conduct of the parties, possible cut-off effects, 
and security considerations. These will now be examined individually. 
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Disparity of coastal lengths 
The Court held that where ‘disparities in the lengths of coast are 
particularly marked, the Court may choose to treat that fact or geography 
as a relevant circumstance that would require some adjustment to the 
provisional equidistance to be made.’265 The Court went through former 
jurisprudence to elaborate on the law in this regard. It cited the Cam-
eroon/Nigeria case, where it was held that ‘a substantial difference in the 
lengths of the parties’ respective coastlines may be a factor to be taken 
into consideration in order to adjust or shift the provisional equidistance 
line.’266 It further noted that in the Greenland/Jan Mayen case and in the 
Libya/Malta case, disparities of 1:9 and 1:8, respectively, were consid-
ered so great as to justify adjusting the equidistance line.267 At the same 
time it should be made clear that taking account of disparity in coastal 
lengths does not ‘mean a direct and mathematical application of the 
relationship’ between the lengths of the coastal fronts, as was held in the 
Greenland/Jan Mayen case.268 That being said, the Court held that it did 
not see ‘such particularly marked disparities’ in the present case. In light 
of this view, it was held that the Court could not disregard the fact that a 
considerable portion of the Ukrainian coast that was considered relevant 
in the case projected into the same area as other segments of the Ukrain-
ian coast, in such a way as to strengthen but not spatially expand the 
Ukrainian entitlement. Accordingly, the Court downgraded the relevance 
of the Ukrainian coastal length in relation to that of Romania, making the 
disparities between the two less prominent.  
The enclosed nature of the Black Sea and existing maritime delimita-
tions in the region 
Romania argued that because of the enclosed nature of the Black Sea, 
together with pre-existing delimitation agreements in the region, delimit-
ation in the present case should not dramatically depart from the method 
previously used in the same sea between other riparian states.269 The 
Court held that this view had no bearing on the method to be used in the 
present case; and that as for other delimitation agreements in the same 
sea, the Court would take them into account when considering the end 
point of the single maritime boundary between Romania and Ukraine.270  
The presence of Serpents’ Island 
The Court started by recalling that the Serpents’ Island could not serve as 
a base point for constructing a provisional equidistance line, since it did 
not form part of the general configuration of the coast.271 It is also worth 
noting the Court’s initial reasoning in this regard, where it was held that 
since the coastal length of the island was so short, a mere 2 kilometres, 
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compared to mainland coast of 705 kilometres, including it or not would 
be insignificant to the overall coastal length.272 Further, a 12 nm territorial 
sea was attributed to Serpents’ Island pursuant to agreements of the 
parties. The Court held that, with the island located only 20 nm to the east 
of Ukraine’s mainland coast, and the enclosed nature of the Black Sea in 
area to be delimited, any EEZ and continental shelf entitlements 
generated by the island could not project further than the entitlements 
generated by Ukraine’s mainland coast because of the southern limit 
established on the Crimean Peninsula.273 In light of these circumstances, 
the Court concluded that the presence of Serpents’ Island did not call for 
an adjustment of the provisional equidistance line. Moreover, this line of 
argumentation made it unnecessary for the Court to consider whether 
Serpents’ Island constituted a ‘rock’ under Article 121(3) or an ‘island’ 
under Article 121(1) of the LOS Convention.274  
Conduct of the parties 
According to the Court, Ukraine was not relying on state activities in 
order to prove a tacit agreement or modus vivendi between the parties, in 
order to undermine the delimitation line claimed by Romania.275 The 
Court reiterated Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago case where it was held 
that ‘resource-related criteria have been treated more cautiously by the 
decisions of international courts and tribunals, which have not generally 
applied this factor as a relevant circumstance.’276 And with respect to 
fisheries, the Court held that no evidence had been submitted by Ukraine 
that any delimitation line other than the one claimed by it would ‘likely to 
entail catastrophic repercussions for the livelihood and economic well-
being of the population’, as had been developed as the criteria in the Gulf 
of Maine case.277 For these reasons, the Court concluded that the cir-
cumstances invoked did not justify an adjustment of the provisional 
equidistance line.278 
Cut-off effects 
The Court acknowledged that the positions of both parties curtailed each 
other’s entitlements to an EEZ and a continental shelf generated by each 
respective coastline.279 However, the Court considered that the equidis-
tance line drawn by it would avoid such encroachments, as it allowed for 
the adjacent coasts of the parties to produce their effects in a reasonable 
and mutually balanced way.280 Thus, the Court found no reason to adjust 
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the provisional equidistance line because of these alleged cut-off ef-
fects.281  
Security considerations 
The Court first held that legitimate security considerations of the parties 
may play a role in determining the final delimitation line, and referred to 
the Libya/Malta case.282 However, in the present case the provisional 
equidistance line drawn by the Court differed substantially from the lines 
drawn by Romania and by Ukraine. The Court held that the provisional 
equidistance line fully respected the legitimate security interests the par-
ties, obviating any need to adjust the provisional equidistance line for the 
reasons given by the parties.283  
The disproportionality test 
The Court then proceeded to the final stage, of checking that the result 
thus far arrived at did not lead to any significant disproportionality with 
respect to the respective coastal lengths and the apportionment of 
maritime areas thereof.284 The Court agreed with observation held in the 
Anglo-French Continental Shelf case that: 
…it is disproportion rather than any general principle of propor-
tionality which is the relevant criterion or factor . . . there can 
never be a question of completely refashioning nature . . . it is 
rather a question of remedying the disproportionality and inequit-
able effects produced by particular geographical configurations or 
features.285 
And further, that: 
The continental shelf and exclusive economic zone allocations are 
not to be assigned in proportion to length of respective coastlines. 
Rather, the Court will check, ex post facto, on the equitableness of 
the delimitation line it has constructed.286 
According to the Court, this final equitability check of the line drawn thus 
far in the delimitation process could be only approximate, and it remained 
a matter for the Court’s discretion to substantiate it by reference to the 
overall geography of the area on a case-by-case basis.287 The Court noted 
that the ratio of the respective coastal lengths for Romania and Ukraine 
was approximately 1:2.8, and that of the relevant area between Romania 
and Ukraine approximately 1:2.1. The Court then concluded that the line 
provisionally constructed and checked carefully for any relevant circum-
stances that might warrant adjustment, required no further alteration.288 
Hence, the provisional equidistance line drawn at the first stage of the 
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delimitation process became the single maritime boundary delimiting the 
territorial sea, the EEZ and the continental shelf between Romania and 
Ukraine. 
Conclusion 
The Romania/Ukraine case is the fifth and last case after the entry into 
force of the LOS Convention to be examined in this study. The ICJ af-
firmed the predominant role recent jurisprudence has given the cor-
rective/equity approach when delimiting the EEZ, the continental shelf, 
or a single maritime boundary in accordance with Articles 74(1) and 
83(1) of the LOS Convention. It did this first of all by laying out the law 
on maritime delimitation under these Articles in general terms – although 
the Court was to delimit a single maritime boundary, the Court argued the 
law as such. And it is worth noting that for the Court this way of 
interpreting the law on maritime delimitation seems to have been defined 
with precision in jurisprudence over the two last decades. Yet, as this 
study has shown, courts and tribunals have varied in their approach dur-
ing the last two decades, rather than defining one method with precision. 
Nevertheless, the trend has been clear towards the use of the corrective/ 
equity approach, as we have seen. The assurance and clear language of 
the Court’s reasoning may therefore be understood only as strengthening 
the role of the corrective/equity approach. According to the Court, the 
one method to be used is the corrective/equity approach, unless no other 
method is justified, under Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of the LOS Conven-
tion. It is worth reiterating what the Court held in this regard: that as far 
as delimitation between adjacent coasts is concerned, an equidistance line 
will be drawn ‘unless there are compelling reasons’ that make this ‘un-
feasible’ in the particular case. And as to delimitation between opposite 
coasts, the Court simply held that the provisional delimitation line ‘will 
consist’ of an equidistance line. Hence, the presumption for the correc-
tive/equity approach was not only upheld in the Romania/Ukraine case, it 
was also further strengthened.  
Moreover, rather than prescribing a two-stage approach, as in previous 
cases, the Court described the corrective/equity approach as a three-stage 
approach. Materially, nothing new was introduced with this three-step ap-
proach. What the Court did was rather to put a new and more information 
label on the same maritime delimitation process that it has adopted in the 
past. The third stage in the present case, where the Court checked the 
final outcome of the delimitation effected, as a final test to ensure that 
equitableness is not contradicted by a disproportionate result, had been 
adopted previously in several cases, as we have seen. This way of de-
scribing the corrective/equity approach will also be used in the following. 
2.7 Concluding Remarks  
The aim of examining jurisprudence subsequent to the entry into force of 
the LOS Convention was to analyse how courts and tribunals have given 
effect to the provisions on maritime delimitation in the LOS Convention. 
It did this by identifying the method used for maritime delimitation and 
the consideration of relevant circumstances in each case. Here we in-
quired whether courts and tribunals came to favour the corrective/equity 
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approach and follow up on the increasing trend prior to the entry into 
force of the LOS Convention, or if they reverted to favouring the result-
oriented equity approach. The analysis demonstrated that, in all cases 
except one, the method of the corrective/equity approach has been ap-
plied. Moreover, these cases show not only the use of the corrective/ 
equity approach, they also reveal the principal standpoint of this method 
in the law of maritime delimitation.  
In the Cameroon/Nigeria case it was held that there was no presumption 
for any one method to be used under Articles 74(1) and 83(1), putting, in 
theory, all thinkable methods of maritime delimitation on an equal foot-
ing. Yet, in the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Award, it was held that 
the determination of the line of delimitation normally follows that of the 
corrective/equity approach. In the Nicaragua/Honduras case it was held 
that the use of another method than that of the corrective/equity approach 
would require a well-founded justification (as indeed was the situation in 
this case). In the Guyana/Surinam Award it was held that there is pre-
sumption for the corrective/equity approach in situations with opposite as 
well as adjacent coasts. And finally in the Romania/Ukraine case it was 
held that there is presumption for the corrective/equity approach unless 
compelling reasons make this unfeasible in the particular case.  
All these cases clearly indicate that, single maritime boundary or not, 
there is now presumption for the corrective/equity approach under Article 
74(1) and 83(1), and that applying another approach will require a well-
founded justification. It is also worth noting that in the Nicaragua/ Hon-
duras case, in which the court considered the proper method to be the 
bisector method rather than the corrective/equity approach, the shift of 
method was justified by reference to two unusual circumstances in the 
case: the extreme convexity of the coast, and a constantly shifting river 
delta. Important is also the fact that the Court described the bisector 
method as an “approximation” of the equidistance method, so any depar-
ture from the use of the equidistance method can be said to have been 
minimal. 
On the whole we may conclude that, prior to the entry into force of the 
LOS Convention, there was an increased trend in jurisprudence towards 
the use of the corrective/equity approach, and that this trend has contin-
ued subsequent to the Convention’s entry into force. The principal or 
legal standing of the corrective/equity approach under Articles 83(1) and 
74(1) has also been clarified. There is now presumption for the correc-
tive/equity approach, either a continental shelf or EEZ boundary shall be 
drawn separately or by one single maritime boundary. Another approach 
requires compelling reasons or a well founded justification. 
This corrective/equity approach consists of three defined stages: (i) first, 
the court or tribunal will establish a provisional equidistance line, using 
methods that are geometrically objective and also appropriate for the 
geography of the area in which the delimitation is to take place; (ii) 
secondly, as the final line should result in an equitable solution according 
to Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of the LOS Convention, the Court will at the 
second stage consider whether the there are factors in the case calling for 
an adjustment of the provisional equidistance line in order to achieve an 
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equitable result; (iii) thirdly, the Court will check that there exists no 
significant disproportionality in the ratios of the coastal length of each 
state and the maritime areas falling to either side of the delimitation line 
as it now stands, having taking into account the relevant circumstances.  
Having examined the law and legal framework on maritime delimitation, 
in the following we will examine the procedural obligations of Norway 
and the Russian Federation under the LOS Convention; and apply the law 
as found, de lege lata, on the maritime boundary dispute between Norway 
and the Russian Federation in the Barents Sea. 
3 Procedural Obligations of Norway and the 
Russian Federation under Part XV of the LOS 
Convention 
3.1 Introduction 
As state parties to the LOS Convention, both Norway and the Russian 
Federation are bound by the jurisdictional-procedural provisions in Part 
XV of the Convention for settling disputes. Part XV identifies an obli-
gatory system for the settlement of disputes arising between parties 
concerning its interpretation and application. According to its Articles 
74(1) and 83(1), delimitation of the EEZ and the continental shelf is to be 
effected by agreement on the basis of international law. Articles 74(2) 
and 83(2) state further that if no delimitation agreement can be reached 
within a ‘reasonable period of time’, the states concerned shall resort to 
the procedures provided for in Part XV. As the negotiations between 
Norway and the Russian Federation over their maritime boundaries have 
been going on for almost four decades now, a ‘reasonable period of time’ 
has arguably past. In the following we focus on the obligations of these 
two states under Part XV of the Convention. 
3.1.1 Obligations under Section 1 of Part XV 
Article 279 obliges state parties to settle disputes under the Convention 
by peaceful means in accordance with Article 2, paragraph 3, of the UN 
Charter, and to seek a solution by the means indicated in Article 33, 
paragraph 1 of the Charter. Article 2, paragraph 3 of the Charter provides 
that ‘All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful 
means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, 
are not endangered’. Thus, this Article is applicable only when there is a 
‘dispute’ and it relates to either the ‘interpretation’ or ‘application’ of the 
LOS Convention. The standard definition of an international ‘dispute’ is 
that given by the PCIJ in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case: 
‘A dispute is a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal 
views or of the interests of two persons.’289 The ICJ has stated that 
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whether an international dispute exists or not is ‘a matter of objective 
determination’.290 Further, the mere assertion or denial that a dispute 
exists is not conclusive of the existence of a dispute. Nor is the mere 
existence of conflicting interests, the instigation of proceedings, or a 
purely theoretical disagreement on a point of law or fact.291 The ICJ has 
held that ‘it must be shown that the claim of one party is positively 
opposed to the other’.292 With respect to the delimitation of maritime 
boundaries, this is undoubtedly an issue relating to the interpretation and 
application to the LOS Convention. The determination of whether there is 
in fact a dispute over where a boundary should be, must be based on an 
assessment of the claims of the parties as to where they argue the bound-
ary should be. As to the current case, Norway argues the boundary should 
be based on the equidistance principle, whereas the Russian Federation 
argues it should be based on the sector line principle. As these claims are 
clearly opposed to each other, and relate to the interpretation of interna-
tional law, the preliminary requirement of there being a dispute is suffi-
ciently met.  
Another important aspect is that by incorporating this provision the state 
parties agree to refrain from endangering not only international peace and 
security, but also ‘justice’: in other words, this provision requires them to 
settle their disputes in accordance with justice or international law293. The 
means for seeking a solution indicated in Article 33 are ‘... negotiation, 
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to 
regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their own 
choice’. Thus, in theory, state parties may resort to any conceivable kind 
of dispute settlement mechanism, as long as it takes due account of inter-
national law. Note should be made of the fact that the reference is only to 
the ‘means’ referred to in Article 33, not to the Article as a whole. By this 
reference, the LOS Convention avoids the restriction in Article 33 that 
only disputes ‘the continuance of which is likely to endanger the mainten-
ance of international peace and security’ are subject to settlement under 
Chapter VI of the Charter. Therefore, any dispute concerning the inter-
pretation or application of the LOS Convention must be settled by peace-
ful means, whether or not it is likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
Article 280 reiterates what can be read from Article 279, the right of state 
parties to depart from the provisions of Part XV and to use instead ‘any 
peaceful means of their own choice.’ They can do so even if any proced-
ure under section 1 has started (‘at any time’). Thus, the state parties are 
complete masters of the procedure to be used for settling the dispute. 
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Should, however, resort under Article 280 to a procedure outside the 
scope of Part XV fail to bring a solution, Article 281 makes clear that the 
parties may resort back to the procedures specified in section 1, unless 
any agreement excludes any further procedure. In that case, the case will 
remain unsettled without any obligations to continue negotiations to reach 
a settlement under sections 1.294 
Article 282 applies when state parties have agreed through general, 
regional, or bilateral agreement, or otherwise, that the dispute may, at the 
request of any party to the disputes, be submitted to a procedure that en-
tails binding decision. In such a case, that procedure shall apply in lieu of 
the procedures provided for in section 1, unless the parties to the dispute 
agree otherwise.295 The use of the word ‘otherwise’ is meant to incorp-
orate, in particular, the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the ICJ by declar-
ations made under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court.296 
Norway has recognized as compulsory ipso facto and without special 
agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation 
(that is, on condition of reciprocity) the jurisdiction of the ICJ297. In rela-
tion to all disputes regarding the LOS Convention, however, Norway has 
declared that all limitations and exceptions made in relation to settlement 
of disputes under the Convention298 shall also apply if the matter is 
brought before the ICJ directly, i.e. by reference to Article 282 of the 
Convention. The Russian Federation, on the other hand, has not recog-
nized the ICJ as compulsory. Consequently, the Norwegian recognition of 
the ICJ as compulsory will not come into play in the present case, and a 
separate consent from both Norway and the Russian Federation is needed 
for the Court to have jurisdiction to adjudicate in the matter.299  
Article 283 obliges the states parties to exchange views, expeditiously, 
with regard to settlement by negotiation or other peaceful means. As for 
the current dispute, which arose prior to entry into force of the LOS 
Convention, it must be read as obligation to exchange views expedi-
tiously following the entry into force of the LOS Convention for each 
respective state – for Norway 1996300 and for the Russian Federation 
1997.301 The phrase ‘other peaceful means’ re-emphasizes the basic prin-
ciple in Article 280 that the parties are free to agree at any time on the 
settlement of the dispute by any means of their own choice. But the rule 
should also be seen as an obligation to get into negotiations, although not 
as an obligation to reach an agreement302. The ICJ has stated:  
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…the parties are under obligation to enter into negotiations with a 
view to arriving at an agreement, and not merely to go through a 
formal process of negotiation as a sort of prior condition for the 
automatic application of a certain method of delimitation in the ab-
sence of an agreement; they are under an obligation so to conduct 
themselves that the negotiations are meaningful, which will not be 
the case when either of them insists upon its own position without 
contemplating any modification of it.’303 
We may ask to what extent the parties are under obligation to continue 
with an exchange of views. This question was considered by ITLOS in 
the Malaysia vs Singapore Case. The Tribunal found that ‘Malaysia was 
not obliged to continue with an exchange of view when it concluded that 
this exchange could not yield a positive result’.304 This case reaffirmed 
two previous decisions of the Tribunal where it was held that ‘a State 
Party is not obliged to pursue procedures under Part XV, section 1, of the 
Convention when it concludes that the possibilities of settlement have 
been exhausted’305 and that ‘a State Party is not obliged to continue with 
an exchange of views when it concludes that the possibilities of reaching 
agreement have been exhausted.’306 
Article 284 refers to conciliation, the so-called voluntary conciliation 
procedure. This requires consent from both parties, and underlines further 
the fundamental principle that the parties are complete masters of the 
procedures to be used to settle the dispute. In accordance with Annex 5, 
section 1, conciliation proceedings instituted before a five-member con-
ciliation commission may solve the dispute only by means of an agree-
ment between the parties, as the commission’s power is restricted to 
hearing the parties, examining their claims and objections, and making 
proposals to the parties with a view of reaching an amicable settlement. 
Summary section 1 
First of all, the dispute between Norway and the Russian Federation qual-
ifies legally as an international dispute in relation to international law. 
Secondly, the parties are bound to find an equitable solution to their dis-
pute in accordance with international law. Thirdly, they are obliged to 
settle their dispute by peaceful means and not through the use of force. 
Fourthly, they are obliged to seek a solution by the means indicated in 
Article 33 of the UN Charter. Still, they are complete masters of the pro-
cedures to be used, as both Article 33 of the Charter and Article 281 of 
the LOS Convention prescribe their right to choose peaceful means of 
their own choice. Fifthly, they are obliged to proceed expeditiously to an 
exchange of views regarding settlement by negotiations or other peaceful 
means.  
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Further, where settlement cannot be reached using one procedure, the 
parties must consider what other means could be utilized to settle the dis-
pute. Moreover, the obligation to enter into an exchange of views should 
also be seen as an obligation to get into negotiations with a view to arriv-
ing at an agreement. This may be seen as obligation to make compro-
mises; however, any length to which the parties are under obligation to 
compromise must be understood from the legal standing of the parties’ 
claims in relation to the international law de lege lata. Therefore, the 
parties are obliged to continue with negotiations and exchange of views 
only to the point where the possibilities of reaching an agreement have 
been exhausted. We may say that, when interpreting all articles in section 
1 as a whole, parties to a dispute are not only under obligation to enter 
into negotiations with a view to concluding an agreement (ref. ‘…to seek 
a solution by the means of…), but more so to pursue them as far as 
possible to reach a final agreement.  
This becomes even more evident when interpreting the articles in section 
1 in relation to those in section 2 and 3 which describe the next stages in 
the procedure to be followed if initiatives after section 1 fail to bring any 
final solution – that is compulsory conciliation or dispute settlement en-
tailing binding decisions. So before invoking any of the procedures set 
out in section 2 and 3, state parties should endeavour to settle their 
dispute by recourse to the procedures entailing non-binding decisions in 
sections 1. 
3.1.2 Obligations under Section 2 and 3 of Part XV 
Section 2 deals with compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions. 
Where no settlement has been reached with reference to the obligations of 
the parties under section 1, Article 286 provides that the dispute shall be 
submitted at the request of any party to the dispute to a court or tribunal 
having jurisdiction in this regard. Any decision rendered by such a court 
or tribunal shall be final and shall be complied with by all parties to the 
dispute.307 Article 287 of the Convention lists specific courts or tribunals 
state parties may choose as their forum in this regard: those are ITLOS, 
the ICJ, an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII, or 
a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII of 
the Convention. Norway has declared308 pursuant to Article 287 that it 
chooses the ICJ for the settlement of disputes concerning the interpre-
tation or application of the Convention, while the Russian Federation has 
declared309 that it chooses an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance 
with Annex VII310. As Norway and the Russian Federation have not 
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accepted the same procedure, disputes between them may only be 
submitted to arbitration in accordance with Annex VII.311  
However, Article 298 (1)(a) of Section 3, allows states parties to declare 
that they do not accept one or more of the compulsory procedures entail-
ing binding decision with reference to disputes concerning the interpre-
tation or application of the articles dealing with delimitation of the terri-
torial sea, the EEZ and the continental shelf. Opening up for the parties to 
exempt from the compulsory procedures entailing binding decision must 
be seen from the perspective that this was the sole compromise solution 
available to them in light of the wide gap between their opposing views 
as to whether the LOS Convention should contain compulsory third party 
settlement of border disputes.312 They could agree only on compulsory 
conciliation, which, to its fullest extent, may end up with a non-binding 
recommendation from a conciliation commission.313 However, also com-
pletely excluded from this obligation are disputes that arose prior to the 
entry into force of the Convention.314 This raises the question as to when 
the dispute between Norway and the Russian Federation legally came to 
existence. The opposing legal views, described above, that qualify as an 
international dispute in relation to the LOS Convention came about in the 
1970s when the matter for the first time became the subject of negotia-
tions between Norway and the Soviet Union. For these reasons, the 
dispute must quite clearly be seen to have arisen prior to the entry into 
force of the LOS Convention. Accordingly, Norway and the Russian Fed-
eration are not obliged to constitute any compulsory conciliation proced-
ure, when failing to reach an agreement abiding its obligations under 
section 1 as described above. 
Compulsory conciliation or not, in order to escape the compulsory pro-
cedure entailing binding decision, the parties must declare they are not be 
bound by this criteria. The Russian Federation has made a declaration 
under Article 298 that ‘it does not accept the procedures, provided for in 
section 2 of Part XV of the Convention, entailing binding decisions with 
respect to disputes concerning the interpretation or application of Articles 
15, 74 and 83 of the Convention, relating to sea boundary delimita-
tions.’315 Norway on the other hand has declared that ‘that it does not ac-
cept an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII for any 
of the categories of disputes mentioned in Article 298.’316 Thus, Norway 
allows for compulsory procedure entailing binding decision in general, 
unless the ascribed procedure to be used by section 2 is an arbitral tri-
bunal in accordance with Annex VII. As noted above, since Norway and 
the Russian Federation have not accepted the same procedure under 
Article 287, disputes between them may be submitted to arbitration only 
in accordance with Annex VII. Consequently, even if the Russian Federa-
tion were to change its view and accept compulsory procedure entailing 
                                                     
311
 Art. 287(2)(5). 
312
 Nordquist, ed., 1989, p. 122.  
313
 LOS Convention Annex 5, Arts. 11–14.  
314
 LOS Convention Art. 298(a)(i). 
315
 UNTS 16 November 1994, No. 31363. 
316
 Ibid. 
 The Law of Maritime Delimitation and Russian–Norwegian Maritime Boundary Dispute 65 
 
binding decision, it could not invoke Article 287 and request the dispute 
to be submitted to the court or tribunal with jurisdiction under section 2. 
In order for the Russian Federation to bring Norway to a binding third-
party settlement procedure, the Russian Federation must in addition 
change its view regarding the forum to be used, to the ICJ. The Russian 
Federation could also accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ by declaring its 
acceptance in accordance with Article 36(2) of the Statutes of that Court, 
as this would apply in lieu of the procedure under section 2 and would 
meet Norway’s condition on reciprocity under its current declaration. 
Conversely, in order for Norway to bring the Russian Federation to a 
binding third-party settlement procedure, the Russian Federation would 
first have to withdraw its declaration under 298 that it does not accept 
third-party settlement or declare that it accepts the ICJs ‘optional clause’, 
whereas Norway in the former case also would have to withdraw its 
position on non-acceptance of an arbitral tribunal under Annex VII. 
Summary sections 2 and 3 
Judging from the declarations made pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of Part 
XV and Article 36 of the Statutes of the ICJ, the views of Norway and the 
Russian Federation on having the dispute brought for third-party settle-
ment entailing binding decision seem quite clearly to have been designed 
to avoid such procedures, as neither of the parties may bring in the other 
for such. Accordingly, all good intentions aside, Part XV does not seem 
to bring the parties any closer to a solution to their maritime boundary 
dispute. This of course, must be seen in light of the fact Norway and the 
Russian Federation both hold that their maritime boundary dispute is best 
resolved through negotiation and not litigation. On the other hand, Nor-
way generally fears binding third-party settlement to a lesser extent than 
does the Russian Federation, as Norway has accepted both the ICJ’s 
‘optional clause’ and compulsory procedure entailing binding decision 
under Section 2 of Part XV as such, just not an arbitral tribunal in accord-
ance with Annex VII.  
4 The Maritime Dispute between Norway and the 
Russian Federation in the Barents Sea and the 
Application of the Three-step Method 
4.1 Introduction 
Having examined the law and legal framework of maritime delimitation 
(ch. 2), and Norway’s and the Russian Federation’s procedural obliga-
tions under the LOS Convention (ch. 3), in this chapter we apply the law 
of maritime delimitation, as found, de lege lata, on the maritime bound-
ary dispute between Norway and the Russian Federation in the Barents 
Sea. However, as full source materials have not been available to the au-
thor, the examination is limited to make some overall considerations. As 
an introduction to the subject matter, this chapter begins by reviewing the 
general geography of the area in question. Then follows an overview of 
the negotiations thus far. Finally, we examine the dispute by applying the 
three-step method identified in chapter 2. 
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4.2 The Barents Sea 
Although difficult to define precisely, the Barents Sea forms part of the 
Arctic Sea and covers about 1.4 million km2.317 To the north it is bounded 
by the archipelagos of Svalbard and Franz Josef Land, belonging to 
Norway and the Russian Federation respectively. To the east it is bound-
ed by the archipelago of Novaya Zemlya and by the Kara Sea in the 
north. To the south it is borders on the mainland coasts of the Russian 
Federation and Norway, and the White Sea in the east. Finally in the west 
it meets the Norwegian Sea in the south and the Denmark Sea in the 
north, whereas the dividing line follows a straight line drawn from North 
Cape on the Norwegian mainland towards Bear Island (Norwegian) and 
further on to South Cape on Svalbard.318  
The oceanography of the Barents Sea is characterized by relatively shal-
low water, varying between 200 and 500 metres for the most part, but is 
as shallow as 50 m. on the Spitsbergen Bank. Average depth is 230 m.319  
The Barents Sea is extremely rich in living and non-living natural re-
sources and has great economic potential. The 2008 US Geological Sur-
vey has estimated the undiscovered, conventional, technically recoverable 
petroleum resources in the Barents Sea Shelf at more than 76 billion bar-
rels of oil equivalent – which includes approximately 11 billion barrels of 
crude oil, 380 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and two billion barrels of 
natural gas liquids.320 The Barents Sea is also an important feeding area 
for cod, capelin, haddock, herring, sea perch, catfish, plaice, halibut, 
Atlantic salmon and redfish.321 The average yearly catch in the Barents 
Sea is at present about one million metric tons.322 
4.3 Four Decades of Negotiations 
The first contacts between Norway and the Soviet Union in regard to the 
ongoing maritime boundary dispute in the Barents Sea took place in 
1967, when Norway took the initiative to start negotiating a maritime 
boundary for its continental shelf.323 Prior to this Norway and the Russian 
Federation had concluded an agreement in 1957 delimiting most of the 
Varanger Fjord area.324 What led up to this scenario were claims by both 
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states to their continental shelves. Norway made a formal claim to its 
continental shelf in 1963, issuing a Royal Decree which claimed sov-
ereign rights over: 
The seabed and the subsoil in the maritime areas outside the coast 
of Norway…as far as the depth of the superjacent waters admit of 
exploitation of natural resources…but not beyond the median line 
in relation to other states.325 
The Soviet Union issued a Decree five years later, claiming sovereign 
rights over:  
The seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the 
coast or to the islands of the USSR…to a depth of 200 metres or, 
beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters 
admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said 
areas.326 
The Soviet Decree went on to reiterate Article 6 of the Convention on the 
Continental Shelf as regards boundary delimitation with neighbouring 
states, i.e. the triple rule of agreement/equidistance/special circumstances 
(as examined above in 2.3.2). Thus both states in their internal law indi-
rectly, as in case of Norway, and directly, as in case of the Soviet Union, 
referred to the applicable provision in treaty law at that time, which was 
Article 6 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf. Norway, however, 
made no reference to the special circumstances criterion in its legislation. 
The parties held first an informal meeting on the matter in Oslo in 1970, 
and in 1974 the parties agreed to open formal negotiations in Moscow.327 
In 1977 the negotiations became further complicated with the establish-
ment of a 200 nm EEZ by Norway and a 200 nm fishery zone by the 
Soviet Union.328 The negotiations were now concerned not only with the 
delimitation of the continental shelf, but also with the delimitation of the 
EEZ and the fishery zone. When the Soviet Union changed its fishery 
zone to a 200-nm EEZ in 1984, the subject matter of the negotiations 
changed similarly.329 Since then the parties have agreed that the purpose 
of the negotiations must be to delimit the continental shelf and the EEZ 
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by a single maritime boundary, where the boundaries should be drawn 
within 200 nm from the baselines.330 Since the start of the negotiations 
both states have respected international law as the applicable law of the 
delimitation process.331 When the negotiations, started Article 6 the Con-
vention on the Continental Shelf was the governing law; today the gov-
erning law is LOS Convention Articles 74 and 83, as examined above.332 
Throughout the negotiations the Russian Federation has maintained that a 
sector line along the longitude 32° 4' 35’ E forms the appropriate delimit-
ation line in accordance with international law.333 This sector line was 
drawn by the Soviet Sector Decree of 1926, in which sovereignty was 
asserted over all islands, discovered and undiscovered, located between 
32° 4' 35’ E and 168° 49' 30’ W.334 However, the portion of the Svalbard 
archipelago situated within this sector, also known as the ‘Svalbard box’, 
was taken into account (see fig. 1 below).335 Norway, on the other hand, 
has maintained that an equidistance line forms the appropriate maritime 
boundary in accordance with international law. These competing claims 
involve a disputed area of about 175,000 km2, of which 155,000 km2 lie 
within the Barents Sea and 20,000 km2 just north of it.336 
Following the establishment of the 200 nm zones in 1977, and the non-
achievement of resolving their maritime boundary dispute, Norway and 
the Soviet Union concluded a provisional arrangement to regulate fishing 
activities in parts of the disputed area. Apart from stating that both coun-
tries are to refrain from conducting inspections or from exercising any 
form of control over fishing vessels of the other country, it also contains 
provisions relating to how third-country vessels shall be treated in the 
area.337 This arrangement – called the Grey Zone Agreement – applies to 
an area within 200 nm from the mainland coast of both countries. It maps 
out a provisional compromise between the initial positions of the parties, 
and takes into account the location of important fishing areas.338 The 
‘grey zone’ comprises 67,500 km2, of which 41,500 km2 lie in the 
disputed area.339 The Agreement is valid for one year at a time and has 
been extended every year since it was adopted. The Agreement explicitly 
states that the provisional arrangement is not to prejudice the final 
outcome of the negotiations on a maritime boundary.340 
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Various approaches to the boundary question have been put forward by 
the parties. Apparently there exists willingness to compromise, but the 
parties are yet to agree on the closer content of such.341 A joint develop-
ment zone for hydrocarbons has been proposed by the Soviet Union, but 
this has been rejected by Norway.342 For a while negotiations were put on 
hold due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the founding 
of the Russian Federation as its successor state. In 2007, Norway and the 
Russian Federation updated and supplemented the Varanger Fjord Agree-
ment of 1957.343 This revision was due mainly to Norway’s expansion of 
its territorial sea from four to 12 nm and the establishment of a 24 nm 
contiguous zone in 2004.344 The agreement determines a single maritime 
boundary to the end of the territorial sea, and further on for the contigu-
ous zone, continental shelf and the EEZ to the junction of the parties’ 
opposing views since the beginning of the negotiations, and might be 
read as a compromise mapping out the direction of the remaining part of 
the boundary in the southern segment of the Barents Sea.345 However, the 
fact remains that, after almost 40 years of negotiations, a final solution 
has not yet been achieved. 
4.4 Method for Maritime Delimitation in the Barents Sea 
As concluded above in chapter 2, there is now presumption for the use of 
the corrective/equity approach, unless compelling reasons make this un-
feasible in the particular case, when delimiting the EEZ and the contin-
ental shelf in accordance with Articles 83(1) and 74(1) of the LOS Con-
vention. We must therefore ask: are there compelling reasons for apply-
ing another method in the present dispute? In most of the area in which 
the boundary is to be drawn, the coasts of each party are face each other. 
In such situations, the presumption of the corrective/equity approach 
stands very strong, making it highly unlikely that another approach is 
applicable in these areas. As was held in the Romania/Ukraine case: ‘So 
far as opposite coasts are concerned, the provisional delimitation line will 
consist of a median line between the two coasts.’346 However, in the 
southern area, another approach can be argued, as the relevant coasts here 
lie adjacent to each other, and not opposing. The Norwegian coast pro-
jects slightly further seaward in this area than the adjacent general coast 
of the Russian Federation. The effect of this is to push the equidistance 
line a little further to the east, possibly to such an extent that it might be 
regarded as encroaching on areas that more naturally belong to the Rus-
sian Federation.347 The use of the bisector method could counteract this 
effect, drawing instead a 90° angle of the general coast. However, the 
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presence of the Rybachiy Peninsula on the side opposite to Norway at the 
mouth of the Varanger Fjord outweighs this effect to a large degree. 
There seem therefore to be no compelling reasons for using another 
method than the corrective/equity approach. 
Having concluded that the corrective/equity approach is the applicable 
method under international law to the present dispute, we now proceed to 
the first stage of this method: the drawing of the provisional equidistance 
line. 
4.4.1 Drawing the provisional equidistance line 
As was held in the Romania/Ukraine case, the equidistance line is to be 
constructed from the most appropriate points on the coast of the two 
states concerned, with particular attention being paid to those protuberant 
coastal points situated nearest to the area to be delimited.348 Thus the line 
to be constructed is heavily dependent on the physical seaward geography 
of the coasts of both states. Applied to the Barents Sea, this involves two 
different sectors, characterized by different coastal geographies. The first 
sector is characterized by coasts lying adjacent to each other; the second 
by opposite coasts. These two sectors may again be divided into four 
different segments, which will be examined below. Due to lack of accur-
ate source material, all estimates are approximate.  
The first segment is situated in the southern part of the Barents Sea. In 
this sector a single maritime boundary is needed from the terminus of the 
maritime boundary of the Varanger Fjord Agreement of 2007 to the end 
of the 200 nm EEZ. The course of this equidistance line is influenced by 
the adjacent mainland coasts of Norway and the Russian Federation. On 
the Norwegian side, the coastal extremities influencing the equidistance 
line seem to be that of Cape Kibergnes and the northeasternmost 
extremity of the island on which Vardø is located. On the Russian side, 
the equidistance line seems to be influenced by at least two extremities on 
the northwesternmost and northeasternmost extremities on the Rybachiy 
Peninsula. Possibly the line is also influenced by extremities further east 
along the mainland coast.  
The second segment lies beyond 200 nm from the coasts of each state. 
Most of the coasts constructing the line in this segment lie opposite each 
other. The single maritime boundary is here transformed to a continental 
shelf boundary. Coastal extremities on the island of Novaya Zemlya and 
some coastal extremities further west of Vardø on the Varanger Peninsula 
seem here to be decisive for the course of the boundary. Then the coastal 
extremities of Hope Island take over, along with costal extremities further 
north along the coast on Novaya Zemlya. In this area a pocket of high 
seas is formed, as the area lies beyond the EEZs of both states (the so-
called ‘Loophole’). 
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Figure 1 
The third segment lies within 200 nm of both states’ coasts on the Sval-
bard archipelago and on Franz Josef Land, which belong to Norway and 
the Russian Federation, respectively. The continental shelf boundary is 
thus again transformed to a single maritime boundary. Coastal extremities 
on the islands of Kong Karls Land and Kvitøya (Norway) and Viktoria 
(the Russian Federation) seem to construct the equidistance line in this 
segment.  
The fourth segment lies beyond 200 nm of the coasts of the Svalbard 
archipelago and Franz Josef Land. The single maritime boundary is thus 
transformed again to a continental shelf boundary. The equidistance line 
seems here to be influenced by Kvitøya and Viktoria, as in parts of the 
third segment. 
We can now proceed to the second stage of delimitation process: consid-
ering whether there are circumstances that might justify any adjustment 
of the provisional equidistance line indicated above. 
72 Pål Jakob Aasen 
 
4.4.2 Circumstances that might justify adjustment of the provisional 
equidistant line 
Norway contends that there are no circumstances that would justify any 
adjustment of the equidistance line. The Russian Federation considers 
that special circumstances present in the case should lead to a boundary 
following the above-mentioned sector line of the 1926 Soviet Decree; or, 
alternatively, that the Decree itself constitutes the maritime boundary.349  
We begin with the latter. There is naturally no mention of sovereignty 
over maritime zones in the 1926 Decree, since those concepts had not 
been established in international law at the time. The Decree refers expli-
citly to ‘lands and inlands.’350 Therefore it could not have been recog-
nized by international law as a rightful claim to maritime zones, as mari-
time zones simply did not exist at the time when the decree was issued 
(except for the territorial sea). The question becomes if international law 
has since recognized the Decree as a rightful claim to the respective 
maritime zones. There is, however, little to indicate that this is the case.351 
Nor is there any evidence for the sector Decree having been accepted by 
Norway through acquiescence or estoppel or any other form of tacit 
agreement. Quite the contrary: Norway has expressly and consistently 
rejected the use of the sector line as the boundary.352 Hence, the view that 
the Soviet Sector Decree establishes maritime boundary between Norway 
and the Russian Federation seems to have no legal bearing.  
The question then becomes if there are other circumstances in the present 
case that require an adjustment of the equidistance line. The Russian Fed-
eration has advocated a range of non-geographical circumstances to ad-
just the equidistance line. Among these are fishing resources, ice condi-
tions, population size, security interests, shipping and the existence of the 
Svalbard Treaty. As regards fishing resources, case law has recognized as 
relevant dependency on the part of the coastal population on fishing in 
general or on particular fish stocks located within the area of dispute. 
This kind of evidence played a role in both the Greenland/Jan Mayen 
case and the Eritrea-Yemen arbitration.353 However, it must be proved 
that there would be ‘catastrophic repercussions for the livelihood and 
economic well-being of the population of the countries concerned.’354 
This means a strong burden of proof, and it is not likely that this criterion 
is met. If this criterion is to play a role, it would most likely be in the 
southern area in which the parties have already made a provisional 
arrangement (the ‘Grey Zone Agreement’).  
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Fully ascertaining whether this criterion is fulfilled requires further exam-
ination. Security interests have played a role, but it is difficult to see how 
the equidistance line could possibly affect the security interests of Rus-
sian Federation in such a way as to require a shift. On the other hand, ice 
conditions might possibly play a role, as ice conditions in the eastern part 
of the southern Barents Sea are less favourable than in its western part.355 
But, as with fishing resources, the bar for justifying an adjustment based 
on ice conditions is likely to be set relatively high, if recognized at all by 
courts or tribunals. It is therefore not likely that the presence of ice in the 
Barents Sea could justify any adjustment of the equidistance line. Argu-
ments concerning shipping, population size and economic factors unrelat-
ed to the area of delimitation have not been recognized by international 
law. As for the 1920 Svalbard Treaty, it recognizes the full sovereignty of 
Norway over Svalbard, defined within the ‘Svalbard box’.356 The Russian 
Federation holds that the definition of the ‘Svalbard box’ in the Treaty 
limits the extent of Svalbard’s maritime zones. However, the latitudes 
and longitudes in the Treaty are not intended to serve as a maritime 
boundary, but to describe the land and islands to which the Treaty is ap-
plicable. Thus, as with the Soviet Decree of 1926, there is no reason to 
see this as a relevant circumstance for adjusting the equidistance line. Nor 
does the geology of the seabed seem relevant, as it is shallow with no 
marked depressions, and in legal terms consists of one continuous contin-
ental shelf.357 Rather, the role of all non-geographical circumstances has 
been minimized through the endorsement by courts and tribunals of the 
‘neutral criterion’ originally upheld in the Gulf of Maine case.358 Accord-
ing to this criterion, a circumstance must be considered equally suitable 
for both the seabed and the superjacent waters in order to justify an ad-
justment of the equidistance line.359 Preference is therefore given to 
geographical circumstances, whereas non-geographical circumstances are 
subordinated. 
Having concluded that there are no circumstances justifying an adjust-
ment of the provisional equidistance line, we can proceed to the third and 
final stage of the three-step method of the corrective/equity approach: the 
proportionality test. 
4.4.3 Proportionality between the ratios of the resulting maritime area 
allocated to each state and relevant coastal lengths 
The aim of this third and last stage is to check that the result arrived at 
thus far in the delimitation process does not lead to any significant dis-
proportionality by reference to the respective coastal lengths and the 
apportionment of the maritime areas that have been generated.360 As we 
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have seen, courts and tribunals have held that there can never be question 
of completely refashioning nature: it is more a question of remedying any 
disproportionality or inequitable effects produced by particular geograph-
ical configurations;361 And further, that continental shelf and EEZ alloca-
tions are not to be assigned in proportion to the length of the respective 
coastlines. Rather, it is a check, ex post facto, on the equitableness of the 
delimitation line that has been constructed.362 There is no clear require-
ment established by case law as to which method to use for calculating 
the relevant coastal lengths and maritime areas, so this step is largely a 
matter for the court’s discretion.363 However, it is clear that any dispro-
portion would have to be significant in order to warrant adjustment of the 
line drawn thus far. Some estimates made by other authors have indicated 
a division of the Barents Sea as a whole to be about 60/40 in favour of the 
Russian Federation by use of the equidistance line.364 But even if this 
figure is correct, it is probably not correct to look at the Barents Sea as a 
whole; and how to calculate the relevant coasts must also be determined 
in order to make a proper comparison. But the 60/40 figure perhaps gives 
an indication of the proportions in the area. And if it is correct, then it be-
comes difficult to see how this disproportion can be said to be ‘signifi-
cant’. What should be kept in mind is that the disputed area, legally 
speaking, must be far less than 176,000 km2, since the sector principle 
has no legal bearing. What constitutes a disputed area is where the legal 
entitlement to maritime zones of states, either opposite or adjacent to 
each other, overlap.365 In the Barents Sea this is the case with the first 
segment of the first sector, and in the third and fourth segments of the 
second sector, where the rights to a 200 nm continental shelf and EEZ 
overlap. Delving more deeply into this issue would require more accurate 
source material than that made available to the author. Our examination 
will therefore end here. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The three-step method of the corrective/equity clearly seems applicable 
for the maritime delimitation between Norway and the Russian Federa-
tion in the Barents Sea. As it is hard to see how the special circumstances 
advocated by the Russian Federation could justify an adjustment of the 
equidistance line, we must conclude that the equidistance line has strong 
support in the present case, given the status it has gained through the case 
law examined here. The question that remains, and that could not be 
addressed properly here, is whether there, legally speaking, exists 
significant disproportion between the ratios of the resultant maritime area 
allocated to each state and the states’ respective coastal lengths. 
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5 Final remarks 
The overall aim of this study has been to get behind the law of maritime 
delimitation and its application to the maritime boundary disputes be-
tween Norway and the Russian Federation in the Barents Sea. Over two-
thirds of this study has focused on the law and legal framework of mari-
time delimitation. We have noted important developments through exam-
ining jurisprudence after the entry into force of the LOS Convention. 
These foundations were laid by examining the concept, history and devel-
opment of the law of maritime delimitation prior to its entry into force. 
The long time-horizon painted a larger picture, and the conclusions to be 
drawn could thus be made with a higher degree of certainty. By applying 
these findings to the maritime delimitation dispute between Norway and 
the Russian Federation in the Barents Sea, we have seen how a more 
nuanced and updated legal view on this dispute has now crystallized.  
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